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VI

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction over the judgments and decisions of
the Utah Court of Appeals generally and over the decision rendered by the Court
of Appeals in this matter, pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78A-3102.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues preserved by the Utah Supreme Court in its Order, dated January
13, 2011, granting Appellant, Henry Day Ford, Inc.'s ("HDF") request for a Writ
of Certiorari are:
(1)

Whether a majority of the panel of the Court of Appeals erred

in reversing the district court's determination that the parties abandoned their
contracts and that Appellee, Tom Watkins ("Watkins") waived his rights under the
contracts.
(2)

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that there was

a latent ambiguity in the contracts and that HDF breached the contracts.
(3)

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the district

court's determination that Watkins failed to mitigate his damages.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On certiorari review, this Court reviews the decision of the Court of
Appeals, not the decision of the district court." Colosimo v. Roman Catholic
Bishop. 156 P.3d 806 (Utah 2007). Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its
l

assessment of the issues of abandonment, waiver, latent ambiguity, breach of
contract, and failure to mitigate present questions of law that the Supreme Court
review for correctness. The correctness of the Court of Appeals' decision turns on
whether that court accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the
appropriate standard of review. State of Utah v. Cram, 46 P.3d 230 (Utah 2002);
State v. Visser. 22 P.3d 1242 (Utah 2000). "We review the decision of the court of
appeals for correctness, and give no deference to its conclusions of law". Wardley
Better Homes & Gardens v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99112, 61 P.3d 1009.
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals' Opinion is set forth as: Watkins v. Henry Day Ford,
2010 UT App 243 (Utah App. 2010). Attached at Appendix 1. The Trial Court's
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law of the trial court are attached hereto as
Appendix 2.
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTION AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are no controlling or determinative constitutional and/or statutory
provisions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This is a civil case seeking to establish whether: (a) HDF beached certain
Motor Vehicle Contracts ("Contacts") entered into by the parties; (b) the Contracts

2

were abandoned by the parties; (c) the parties waived their rights in the Contracts;
and (d) Watkins failed to mitigate his damages.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Lower
Courts

Watkins filed a complaint against HDF claiming breach of contract, specific
performance, and unjust enrichment in the Third District Court in and for Salt
Lake County on July 1, 2005. The case proceeded to a bench trial only on
Watkins' breach of contract claim. The trial court ruled in favor of HDF finding
(1) HDF had not breached the Contracts, (2) the parties had waived their rights
under the Contracts, (3) the parties had abandoned the Contracts, and (4) Watkins
failed to mitigate his damages. Based upon these findings the trial court dismissed
Watkins' Complaint, and awarded HDF its costs and attorney's fees.

(See

Appendix 2.)
Watkins appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. The case was poured over to
the Court of Appeals. This matter was argued before the Court of Appeals on June
23, 2010. The Court of Appeals issued its opinion on September 2, 2010, in which
it reversed the trial court finding HDF had breached the Contracts, reversed the
trial court's finding that the parties had abandoned the Contracts, reversed the trial
court's finding that the parties had waived their rights under the Contracts, vacated
the trial court's mitigation determination, and reversed the award of attorney's fees
and costs to HDF. HDF petitioned this Court for a Writ of Certiorari to correct the

3

Court of Appeals' ruling for the reasons set forth below. This Court granted
HDF's Petition for Writ of Certiorari on January 13, 2011.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

At trial it was undisputed that Watkins was very familiar with the

automobile industry, buying and selling vehicles, and preparing the Contracts at
issue in this case since he had been an owner of one or more motor vehicle
dealerships since 1989 and has been involved in the retail automobile business in
various capacities since 1968. (Findings of Fact Tfl.)
2.

In 2002, Ford Motor Company ("Ford") announced that it was going

to reintroduce and manufacture the Ford GT 40. Watkins specifically desired to
purchase two (2) Ford GT 40 automobiles. (Findings of Fact %L and |3.)
3.

Watkins went to HDF for the purpose of purchasing Ford GT 40s

and HDF agreed it would sell Watkins two (2) GT 40 automobiles if HDF was
allocated the vehicles. (Findings of Fact ^4, ^[8, and |9.)
4.

HDF prepared two (2) written standard Motor Vehicle Contracts of

Sale ("Contracts") dated March 4, 2002, for Ford GT 40 automobiles. (Findings of
Fact ^flO.) The Contracts were executed by Watkins and HDF. (Findings of Fact
f 11; copies of the Contracts (Trial Exhibits P1-P4 and D1-D2) are attached hereto
as Appendix 3 hereto.)

5.

Watkins testified that he knew that the Contracts needed to be

prepared accurately and completely. (Trial Tr.l 69:17-19.)
6.

Watkins reviewed the Contracts, found the Contracts to be accurate,

and signed both written Contracts. (Findings of Fact 113.)
7.

As required by the Contracts, Watkins tendered $1,000.00 for each

automobile and HDF accepted the funds as a deposit. (Findings of Fact 115.)
Watkins testified that deposits were made to "secure the deal". (Trial Tr. 77:2124.) The $1,000.00 deposits were part of the Contracts (Trial Tr. 78:23-25) and
Steve Kersey, the HDF employee who prepared the Contracts, testified that the
Contracts would not have been written by the parties without the deposit. (Trial
Tr. 79:15-19.)
8.

After the Contracts were signed, Watkins called HDF and requested

that the Contracts be modified to include the purchase price of 'MSRP', which
modification HDF agreed to make. (Findings of Fact 119; Appendix 3.) At no
time in 2002, did Watkins ask to purchase a Ford GT, or any other Ford model
vehicle other than a Ford GT 40, or, at any time thereafter, request any other
modification of the Contracts. (Findings of Fact 122.)
9.

Jeremy Day, in December of 2002, contacted Ford to inquire if HDF

would be allotted the subject vehicles. (Findings of Fact 124.)

1

All references to the Trial Transcript ('Trial Tr.) are attached collectively at
Appendix 4.
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10.

Jeremy Day, manager of HDF, testified that holding Watkins'

deposit for ten (10) months without being allocated a Ford GT 40 or any indication
that HDF would be allocated such a vehicle was not reasonable and that HDF had
never held a deposit for such a long period of time. (Trial Tr. 141:16-23.)
11.

Ford indicated to Mr. Day, in effect, that HDF would not be allotted

any Ford GT 40's unless HDF won the Ford President's Award or Ford's National
Car and Truck Share Award. (Findings of Fact 125.)
12.

HDF had not, in its 40 year history, received either the President's

Award or National Share Award from Ford. (Findings of Fact 1J26.)
13.

Based upon Ford's representation, HDF believed that it would not be

allocated a Ford GT40 (Trial Tr. 139:13-15) and on December 31, 2002, HDF
returned Watkins's $2,000.00 deposit with a letter which stated:

"[ejnclosed

please find a check for the refund of deposit on your vehicle order. We regret to
inform you that our allocation is not going to allow us to receive this vehicle."
(Findings of Fact ^[27.)
14.

HDF returned Watkins's check in good faith and based upon the

reasonable belief that it would not be allotted any Ford GT 40's. (Findings of Fact
141.)
15.

Watkins negotiated the return of his deposit without objection or

reservation and thereafter, made no attempt to communicate with HDF regarding
the Contracts until June 2005. (Findings of Fact ^[28.)
6

16.

In February 2004, over two years after Watkins accepted the return

of his deposit, HDF learned that it would be allocated a Ford GT based upon
HDF's being awarded the Share of the Nation Award for the 2003 sales year.
(Finding of Fact 129.) In April 2004, HDF was notified by Ford that HDF would
receive the President's Award and would be allocated another Ford GT. (Finding
of Fact 130.)
17.

HDF received a GT automobile on May 31, 2005 (Finding of Fact

132) and a second GT on July 20, 2005 (Finding of Fact 134). In June of 2005,
Watkins, for the first time, demanded HDF sell him a Ford GT even though the
Contracts specifically provided for the purchase of Ford GT 40 vehicles.
(Findings of Fact 135.)
18.

The trial court found that Watkins, by his actions, unequivocally

demonstrated his intent to relinquish his rights to purchase the contracted Ford GT
40 automobiles from HDF. (Findings of Fact 142.)
19.

The trial court concluded that the Contracts entered into by the

parties were clear and unambiguous and were intended to be the final and
complete expression of the parties' bargain (Conclusions of Law 11), the Contracts
were integrated agreements (Conclusions of Law 12), and the Contracts provided
that HDF was to sell to Watkins a Ford GT 40 (Conclusions of Law 14).
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20.

The trial court concluded that HDF had not been allocated a Ford GT

40 and, as such, HDF did not breach the parties' Contract. (Conclusions of Law

115.)
21.

The trial court concluded that the return of Watkins's deposit by

HDF represented conduct inconsistent with the continued existence of the
Contracts. Likewise, Watkins's negotiation of HDF's check in the amount of
$2,000.00 without reservation or objection constituted conduct inconsistent with
the continuation of the Contracts. (Conclusions of Law ^}8.)
22.

The trial court concluded that, based upon the undisputed conduct of

the parties', the parties abandoned the Contracts. (Conclusions of Law |9.)
23.

The trial court concluded that Watkins' acceptance of the return of

his deposit and his subsequent inaction demonstrated Watkins' voluntary
relinquishment of his known rights particularly with Watkins' experience in the
auto dealership industry and both parties' uncertainty as to when and if HDF
would receive the contracted vehicles. (Conclusions of Law ^[10.)
24.

In the late summer of 2005, HDF offered to sell to Watkins for

MSRP a Ford GT. (Findings of Fact f38.)
25.

Watkins refused HDF's offer to purchase a Ford GT. (Findings of

Fact 139.)
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26.

The trial court concluded that Watkins' refusal to purchase the Ford

GT constituted a failure by Watkins to mitigate his damages. (Findings of Fact

139.)
27.

Watkins appealed the trial court's ruling This matter was argued

before the Court of Appeals on June 23, 2010.
28.

The Court of Appeals issued its opinion on September 2, 2010, in

which it reversed the trial court finding HDF had breached the Contracts based
upon a latent ambiguity, reversed the trial court's finding that the parties had
abandoned the Contracts, reversed the trial court's finding that the parties had
waived their rights under the Contracts, vacated the trial court's mitigation
determination, and reversed the award of attorney's fees and costs to HDF.
29.

HDF petitioned this Court for a Writ of Certiorari to correct the

Court of Appeals' erroneous ruling reversing the trial court's findings and
judgment for the reasons set forth below. This Court granted HDF's Petition for
Writ of Certiorari on January 13, 2011.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The clear and undisputed actions of they unequivocally intended to abandon
the Contracts. The return by HDF of Watkins' deposit, and Watkins' negotiation
of the deposit and Watkins' failure to contact HDF after receipt of the returned
deposit demonstrates that the parties intended to, and did, abandon the contracts.
9

The actions of HDF and Watkins resulted in a mutual abandonment of the
Contracts by the parties. The trial court's finding of abandonment were supported
by the evidence and testimony at trial.
Watkins' as an experienced automobile dealer, was very familiar with the
Contracts which were entered into by the parties. Watkins knew his rights under
the Contracts. Watkins demonstrated, by his conduct of cashing the check without
reservation or comment, that he intended to waive his rights under the Contracts.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial Court that there was no facial
ambiguity in the Contracts. The Contracts executed by the parties were standard
form contracts used by automobile dealers in Utah for years. The Contracts
specifically provided, as requested by Watkins, that Watkins wanted to purchase
Ford GT 40 automobiles and HDF agreed to sell to Watkins Ford GT 40
automobiles if HDF received said vehicle.

The Contracts were integrated

Contracts and contained the entire understanding of the parties. HDF did not
breach the Contracts. The Contracts provided that HDF would sell to Watkins a
Ford GT 40. It is undisputed that HDF never had a Ford GT 40 to sell to Watkins.
Watkins failed to mitigate his damages. HDF offered to sell to Watkins a
Ford GT for MSRP. Watkins, however refused to HDF's offer to purchase the
automobile.

10

HDF has not breached the Contracts and, as such, HDF is entitled to
recover its costs and attorney's fees.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING
THAT THE PARTIES5 ABANDONED THE
CONTRACTS,
A.

The Actions of The Parties Demonstrate that Both Parties
had Abandoned the Contracts.

The term 'abandonment' "means the intentional relinquishment of one's
rights in the contract" and to nullify contract rights, "there must be a clear and
unequivocal showing of such abandonment." Eldridge v. Farnsworth, 2007 UT
App. 243, 166 P.3d 639, citing Forsyth v. Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah
1980) (quotations omitted).
If there is a dispute whether abandonment has occurred, "it is usually a
question of fact to be determined from the circumstances of the particular case,
which include not only nonperformance, but also expressions of intent and other
actions of the parties". Timpanogos Highlands, Inc. v. Harper, 544 P.2d 481, 484
(Utah 1975). In determining those facts and circumstances, the trial court is given
"considerable latitude and should not be reversed unless the finding is clearly
erroneous or if this Court is otherwise persuaded that a mistake has been made."
11

See also, Adair v. Bracken, 745 P.2d 849, 851 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Utah Rule of
Civ, P. 52(a). The trial court's findings that the parties abandoned their contract
will not be reversed "unless we are persuaded that the evidence clearly
preponderates against the findings. Timpanogos Highlands, 544 P.2d at 484. HDF
submits that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it set aside the
ruling of the trial court.
(1)

The Trial Court's Findings were Supported by the
Evidence and Testimony at Trial.

In this case, the trial court found that both parties had acted as if they had
abandoned the Contracts. The trial court's factual findings on this issue include:
28. Though plaintiff, as noted above is an experienced
automobile dealer and as such would be very familiar
with industry practices, he negotiated the return of his
deposit without objection or reservation of any type.
Based upon plaintiffs experience, in the auto
dealership industry, plaintiffs claim that he deposited
the check because he did not know what to do with the
check lacks credibility. Plaintiff made no attempt
whatsoever to communicate any concerns he had with
the letter and the check, nor made any attempts within
a reasonable time of receiving the letter and check to
assert or enforce his contract rights.
40. Plaintiff, by his acceptance of his deposit without
reservation, objection, or condition, unequivocally
demonstrated his abandonment of the Contracts.
41. Plaintiffs demand that the Contracts be honored
by defendant over two (2) years after plaintiff accepted
a return of his deposit is unreasonable. The Court
12

finds that defendant returned plaintiffs check in good
faith and based upon the reasonable belief they would
not be allotted any Ford GT 40fs.
42.
Plaintiff, by his actions, unequivocally
demonstrated his intent to relinquish his rights to
purchase the subject vehicles from defendant.
(Findings of Factffi[28,40, 41, 42)
These findings were supported by the evidence and testimony presented at
trial as addressed below. As such, the Appellate Court's decision setting aside the
judgment of the trial court should be reversed.
(2)

Return and Negotiation of the Deposit
Demonstrates that the Parties Intended to, and did.
Abandon the Contracts.

"[A] contract may be [abandoned] by acts or conduct of the parties
inconsistent with the continued existence of the contract." Harris v. IES Assoc.
Inc.. 2003 UT App 112, |37, 69 P.3d 297 (internal quotations omitted.) In this
case, both parties undertook acts inconsistent with the continued existence of the
Contracts.
HDF, which is in the business of selling cars, acted inconsistently with the
existence of the Contracts when it cancelled the Contracts and refunded the
deposit/cash down given by Watkins as security for the performance of the
Contracts. Watkins acted inconsistently with the Contracts when he accepted the

13

testified that he and Steve Kersey, a HDF salesperson, discussed the President's
Award in his first meeting at HDF. Watkins testified:
Q. But you never discussed that [the President's
Award] with Mr. Kersey [the Henry Day Ford sales
person] did you sir?
A. We did talk about the President's Award.
(Trial Tr. 103:6-8.)
A. . . . All I [Watkins] know is as I was calling dealers
from Ogden down to Provo, they made me aware of a
President's Award and that in some way that
figured into the allocation.
Q. And when did that happen, sir? When did they tell
you that?
A. In March of '02.
(Emphasis added.) (Trial Tr. 104:24-25 and 105:1-5.)
The Appellate Court's ruling that: "There was nothing that would have
given Watkins any reason to doubt the accuracy or truth of the information relayed
by Henry Day.

And the crucial information regarding nonoccurrence of the

condition precedent is something that Watkins had no way of independently
verifying" is clearly not supported by Watkins testimony at trial. In fact, as noted,
Watkins, as an experienced car dealer, had the means to independently verify the
information in the letter which accompanied the return of his deposit.
(3)

Mutual Abandonment

16

The parties' actions of mutual abandonment of the Contracts in this case
amount to a manifestation of mutual assent to rescind the Contracts.

See

generally, Forsyth v. Pendleton. 617 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah 1980) (per curiam)
("[W]hen the intent to abandon by one party is coupled with the equal intention of
the other party, such mutual abandonment may under certain circumstances, be
found to constitute rescission of the contract.") HDF, upon the return of Watkins'
deposit, considered the Contracts terminated. (Trial Tr. 152:4-6.) The conduct by
HDF in returning the deposit unequivocally demonstrated HDF's abandonment of
the Contracts because Watkins' deposits were used to "secure the deal". (Trial Tr.
77:21-24.). Thus, HDF's action of returning the deposited money was inconsistent
with the existence of the Contracts.
The trial court correctly ruled that Watkins acquiesced to HDF's
abandonment when he accepted the return of his deposit and negotiated the deposit
check. (Trial Tr. 52:24-25.) Watkins testified that he had completed a number of
Motor Vehicle Sales Contracts (Trial Tr. 69:9-11.) and knew that the deposits were
not only important to the contracts but were part of the contracts. (Trial Tr. 79:2125). Watkins specifically testified at trial:
Q. Did you call Henry Day and say, "Keep my check?
A. No.
Q. Did you call to object to them returning it to them to you?

17

A. No.
(Trial Tr. 80:5-9.)
Watkins' conduct of cashing the check and not contacting HDF until June
2005, over two years after receiving the check, constitutes conduct inconsistent
with the continued existence of the Contracts. (Trial Tr. 80:7-9.)

If Watkins

wanted to maintain any rights under the Contracts, he could have, and should have,
refused to cash the check and/or made an inquiry or objection to HDF. However,
Watkins' negotiation of the deposit demonstrated his agreement to "walk away"
from the deal.
Both parties demonstrated by their conduct an unequivocal intent to
abandon the Contracts.

The conclusion by the trial court that the parties

abandoned the Contract is supported by the evidence and is not clearly erroneous.
(4)

Watkins9 Conduct Demonstrated All of the
Elements Necessary for a Finding of Abandonment.

Elements necessary for a finding of abandonment are similar to the
elements necessary for the finding of a waiver of contractual rights.
"To constitute waiver and abandonment, there must be an existing right,
benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it.
We further clarify that the intent to relinquish a right must be distinct." (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted.) Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Sav. &
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Loan Ass'n. 857 P.2d 935, 937 (Utah, 1993); Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark.
755 P.2d 750, 753 (Utah Ct. App.1988) ("Abandonment means the intentional
relinquishment of onefs rights in the contract; and in order to nullify such rights,
there must be a clear and unequivocal showing of such abandonment.").
The Appellate Court's conclusion that abandonment did not occur rests on
its assertion that Watkins did not intentionally relinquish his rights under the
Contracts. The Appellate Court addressed the trial court's finding of abandonment
in section II of its opinion, paragraphs 17-19. The Appellant Court cited Lucky
Seven Rodeo Corp. V. Clark, 775 .2d 750, 753 (Utah Ct. App. 1088). In Lucky
Seven Rodeo, it was held:
Abandonment means the intentional relinquishment of
one's rights in the contract; and in order to nullify such
rights, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing
of such abandonment.
HDF's return of Watkins' deposit and Watkins' acceptance of the deposit
and subsequent failure to contact HDF regarding his continued desire to purchase a
Ford GT 40, distinctly demonstrate that both parties abandoned the Contracts.
"[t]he intent to abandon . . . need not be shown by the positive testimony of the
purchaser but may be inferred from the acts and conduct of the purchaser, which
are clearly inconsistent with the intent to continue". Forsyth v. Pendleton, 617
P.2d358,361.
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Clearly, Watkins knew his rights under the Contracts. The Appellate Court
found, as noted above, that "[t]here is simply no evidence whatsoever indicating
that Watkins knew he still had rights under the contracts at the time he negotiated
the check refunding his deposit" (Appellate Court Decision ^fl8), contrary to
Watkins own testimony. Watkins, however, testified that "[he] did discuss and the
other dealers were aware of the Presidents Award". (Trial Transcript 102:2325,103:1-8, 104:24-25, 105:1-5.) Watkins also testified that he and Steve Kersey,
a HDF salesperson, discussed the President's Award in his first meeting at HDF.
Notwithstanding the fact that Watkins knew that a Ford award would affect
what dealerships were allocated a Ford GT 40, Watkins accepted his deposit back
without objection or inquiry about the status of the President's Award. For the
Appellate Court to opine that "there is simply no evidence whatsoever indicating
that Watkins knew he still had a right under the Contracts at the time he negotiated
the refund of his deposit" is contrary to Watkins' testimony.
By returning Watkins' deposit, HDF demonstrated its intent not to hold
Watkins to the Contracts. Watkins clearly and distinctly demonstrated his intent to
relinquish his rights and thereby abandon the Contracts when he accepted the
return of his deposit. Watkins specifically testified the $1,000.00 deposits were
part of the Contracts:
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Q. ...[Y]ou and Mr. Kersey agreed to the thousand
dollars [deposit for each GT40]?
A. Yes.
Q. And the thousand dollars was part of the contract,
correct?
A. Yes.
(Trial Tr. 78:20-25.)
Upon receipt of his $2,000.00 deposit from HDF, Watkins negotiated the
check without objection or reservation. HDF then had no further contact with
Watkins for two and half years, until June 2005 when Watkins demanded to buy a
Ford GT from Henry Day Ford even though Watkins and Henry Day Ford never
had an agreement referencing a Ford GT. Watkins' own action of depositing the
check was an affirmative step inconsistent with enforcing his rights under the
Contracts, therefore constituting an intentional relinquishment of an abandonment
of the Contracts. Simply put, Watkins did not take any steps in an attempt to
maintain his rights under the Contracts, and in the absence of any actions
consistent with preserving his rights under the Contracts, Watkins acquiesced in
relinquishing his rights.
The circumstances of this case demonstrate that Watkins abandoned and
relinquished his right to the Contracts. Thus, the Appellate Court should not have
reversed unless they were persuaded that the evidence clearly preponderates

against the findings of the trial court. However, the evidence, and the trial court's
factual findings, demonstrate that the parties mutually abandoned the Contracts.
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
R E V E R S I N G THE T R I A L
COURT'S
DETERMINATION THAT WATKINS WAIVED
HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONTRACTS.
Notwithstanding HDF's return of Watkins' deposit in good faith and based
upon the reasonable belief that HDF would not be allotted any Ford GT 40fs, the
Appellate Court determined that "there was simply no relinquishment by Watkins
of a known right".
The Appellate Court addressed the trial court's finding of waiver in Section
II of its opinion at paragraphs 17 through 19. The Appellate court cited Soter's,
Inc. v. Deseret Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n. 857 P.2d 935 (Utah, 1993), which case
determines the elements of waiver2.

It appears the Appellate Court is again

obscuring the theory of waiver.
This Court in Soter's held:

2

The Soter's case was referred to the Utah Supreme Court from the United States
Federal Court for a clear definition of waiver in Utah. Counsel for HDF represented
Tri-K Contractors, who asserted the waiver argument, in Soter's. During oral
argument, Justice Zimmerman stated, in effect, with regard to the elements of waiver,
"It appears that we have over cooked this issue".
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On this basis, we hold that there is only one legal
standard required to establish waiver under Utah law.
We conclude that Phoenix properly stated the
requirements for waiver:
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known
right. To constitute waiver, there must be an existing
right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its
existence, and an intention to relinquish it.
We further clarify that the intent to relinquish a right
must be distinct. Under this legal standard, a fact
finder need only determine whether the totality of the
circumstances "warrants the inference of
relinquishment."
Such a flexible approach is
particularly important because waiver is a term which
has various meanings depending on the facts and the
context in which it is used. 92 C.J.S.
Soter's at 942 (internal citations omitted.).
This Court has further addressed the burden of persuasion to establish the
defense of waiver. In Red Cliffs Corner v. J.J. Hunan, 2009 UT App 240 ^[15
(Utah App., 2009), citing Kenny v. Rich, 2008 UT App 209, |18, 186 P.3d 989
this Court found:
Whether a party has effectuated a waiver is a mixed
question of law and fact. [Wjhether the trial court
employed the proper standard of waiver presents a
legal question which is reviewed for correctness, but
the actions or events allegedly supporting waiver are
factual in nature and should be reviewed as factual
determinations. Thus, we grant broadened discretion
to the trial court's findings when reviewing
questions of waiver, (Emphasis added.)
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The Red Cliffs Corner case continued at f 33:
Hunan argues that the trial court erred when it
concluded that Hunan waived its breach of lease claim
against RCC. "[A] waiver is the intentional
relinquishment of a known right." IHC Health Servs.,
Inc. v. D & K Mgmt. Inc.. 2008 UT 73,116, 196 P.3d
588. The elements of waiver consist of: "(1) an
existing right, (2) knowledge of its existence, and (3)
an intent to relinquish the right." Id. Hunan does not
argue the first two elements of waiver.
The trial court was warranted in finding, by totality of the testimony and the
evidence, that Watkins demonstrated he waived his rights under the Contracts.
The trial court specifically held: "Plaintiff [Watkins], by his actions, unequivocally
demonstrated his intent to relinquish his rights to purchase the subject vehicles
from defendant [HDF]". (Findings of Fact f41.) The trial court concluded at
Conclusions of Law f 10:
Plaintiffs acceptance of the return of his deposit and
his subsequent inaction clearly demonstrate plaintiffs
voluntary relinquishment of his known rights
particularly with plaintiffs experience in the auto
dealership industry and both parties' uncertainty as to
when and if defendant would receive the contracted
vehicles."
In this case, the elements of waiver were established by the undisputed
evidence. The trial court found:
Though plaintiff, as noted above is an experienced
automobile dealer and as such would be very familiar
with industry practices, he negotiated the return of his
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deposit without objection or reservation of any type.
Based upon plaintiffs experience, in the auto
dealership industry, plaintiffs claim that he deposited
the check because he did not know what to do with the
check lacks credibility. Plaintiff made no attempt
whatsoever to communicate any concerns he had with
the letter and the check, nor made any attempts within
a reasonable time of receiving the letter and check to
assert or enforce his contract rights.
Plaintiff, by his acceptance of his deposit without
reservation, objection, or condition, unequivocally
demonstrated his abandonment of the Contracts.
Plaintiffs demand that the Contracts be honored by
defendant over two (2) years after plaintiff accepted a
return of his deposit is unreasonable. The Court finds
that defendant returned plaintiffs check in good faith
and based upon the reasonable belief they would not be
allotted any Ford GT40?s.
Plaintiff, by his actions, unequivocally demonstrated
his intent to relinquish his rights to purchase the
subject vehicles from defendant.
(Findings of Factffl[28,40, 41, 42.)
Again, Watkins testified at trial:
Q. Did you call Henry Day and say, "Keep my check?
A. No.
Q. Did you call to object to them returning it to them to you?
A. No.
(Trial Tr. 80:5-9.)
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Undisputedly, Watkins, as an experienced automobile dealer, knew his
rights under the Contracts, and clearly demonstrated his intention to relinquish
those rights when he negotiated the $2,000.00 check.
Waiver may be implied from conduct or silence. Soter's at 940.

In this

case, Watkins' conduct, cashing the check, and his silence, not contacting Henry
Day Ford until June 2005, over two years after receiving the check, constitutes a
waiver of the Contracts.
In Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 73 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme
Court held:
[M]ere silence is not a waiver unless there is some duty
or obligation to speak. It is generally accepted that a
duty to speak will not be found where the contracting
parties' deal at arm's length and where the underlying
facts are reasonably within the knowledge of both
parties. Under such circumstances, the plaintiff is
obliged to take reasonable steps to inform himself and
to protect his own interest.
In the case of In the Matter of the Estate of Flake v. Flake, 71 P.2d 589
(Utah 2003) the Court held:
Waiver of a contractual right occurs when a party to a
contract intentionally acts in a manner inconsistent
with its contractual rights, and, as a result, prejudice
accrues to the opposing party or parties to the contract.
Watkins was aware of his rights under the contract, after HDF's negative
representation regarding allocation, that there remained a possibility that HDF
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would receive an allocation of the subject cars if the dealership received a sales
award. HDF's desire to cancel the Contracts based on its own belief that it would
not receive an allocation did nothing to change Watkinsf contingent contractual
rights. Thus, the parties' belief regarding the probability that HDF would receive
an allocation of the subject cars is irrelevant. At the time Watkins received the
refund check, he had a contingent right to purchase the subject cars if later
allocated to HDF. Watkins, however, relinquished his contractual rights when he
negotiated the return of deposit check. With regard to the deposit, Watkins was
asked:
Q. Well that deposit was important, was it not sir?
A. Yes.
(Trial Tr. 79:21-25).
Watkins did nothing to protect his own interest. Watkins' silence by not
contacting HDF upon receipt of the $2,000.00 check or at any other time prior to
June 2005 also demonstrated Watkins' waiver of his rights under the Contracts.
Watkins knew his rights under the Contracts. Watkins demonstrated, by his
conduct of cashing the check without reservation or comment, that he intended to
waive his rights under the Contracts, and Watkins' later demand on HDF that it
honor the Contracts prejudiced HDF. The evidence and the trial court's findings
demonstrate that Watkins waived his rights under Contracts.
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POINT III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS A
LATENT AMBIGUITY IN THE
CONTRACTS.
The Contracts at issue in this case are clear and unambiguous, and could not
be more so. It was undisputed at trial that the Contracts are standard forms, with
which both parties were exceedingly familiar. The law applicable where a contract
is clear and intended to be a final expression of the parties' bargain is clear:
In interpreting a contract, we look to the writing itself
to ascertain the parties' intentions, and we consider
each contract provision in relation to all of the others,
with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring
none.
If the language within the four corners of the contract
is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined
from the plain meaning of the contractual language,
and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of
law....
An ambiguity exists in a contract term or provision if it
is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation
because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms,
or other facial deficiencies.
WebBank v. American General Annuity Service Corp.. 2002 UT 88,1Hf 18-20, 54
P.3d 1139, citing Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, |19, 48 P.3d 918.
In this case, we do not confront unclear language or omitted language,
but rather Watkins' claim to an alternate "plausible" interpretation. Cases that
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have required testing for the presence of contract ambiguity have, not surprisingly,
avoided an etymologically-based test of plausibility. Rather, courts have been
content to permit plausibility to speak for itself. For example, the Utah Supreme
Court stated that the proffered alternate interpretation "must be plausible and
reasonable in light of the language used," (First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch,
Inc.. 966 P.2d 834, 837 (Utah 1998)), and that to merit consideration as an
interpretation that creates an ambiguity, the alternative rendition "must be based
upon the usual and natural meaning of the language used and may not be the result
of a forced or strained construction." Home Sav. & Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 817 P.2d 341, 367 (Utah Ct.App.1991). This Court has left some discretion to
courts in determining whether ambiguity exists, at a minimum one universal
standard applies to this determination: words and phrases do not qualify as
ambiguous simply because one party seeks to endow them with a different
interpretation according to his or her own interests. Alf v. State Farm Fire and
Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272 (Utah, 1993).
When determining whether a contract provision is ambiguous, the parties
may look to evidence beyond the language of the contract.

But "[t]he only

evidence relevant to that inquiry is evidence of the facts known to the parties at the
time they entered the [agreement]." Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, If 19,
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48 P.3d 918 (second alteration in original) (quoting Yeargin, Inc. v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n. 2001 UT 11,1(39, 20 P.3d 287).
A.

There is No Facial Ambiguity in the Contracts.

The Appellate Court agreed with the trial court that "there exists no facial
ambiguity in either of the contracts at issue here". (Appellate Court Opinion f 14.)
Additionally, HDF submits that the Contracts executed by the parties are
undisputedly clear and unambiguous and were intended to be a final and complete
expression of the parties' bargain.

The Contracts specifically provided that

Watkins requested to purchase UGT 40s" (Findings of Facts fflf 2, 3 and 4) and
HDF agreed to sell to Watkins two (2) Ford GT 40's. (Findings of Fact flO)
This Court has recently addressed the principles to be used by trial courts in
interpreting a written contract, and it has consistently held that a "court first looks
to the contract's four corners to determine the parties' intentions"3 In South Ridge
Homeowners' Ass'n v. Brown. 226 P.3d 758, 2010 UT App 23 (Utah App., 2010)
the Court of Appeals held:

3

See: IHC Health Servs. v. D & K Mgmt.. 2008 UT 73,144,196 P.3d 588; Cafe Rio,
Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford- Overton. LLC. 2009 UT 27,125, 207 P.3d 1235; Red Cliffs
Corner v. J.J. Hunan. 2009 UT App 240 (Utah App. 9/3/2009), 2009 UT App 240
(Utah App., 2009); Encon Utah. LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer. LLC. 2009 UT 7,210
P.3d 263 (Utah, 2009); Innerlight. Inc. v. Matrix Group. LLC. 2009 UT 31 (Utah
6/5/2009), 2009 UT 31 (Utah, 2009); Free Motion Fitness. Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank
West. 208 P.3d 209 UT App 120 (Utah App., 2009).
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Accordingly, our interpretation of the relevant
provisions is limited to the four corners of the CC&Rs,
and we of course interpret the relevant language in
light of the overall meaning and intent of the CC&Rs.
See Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins. 2009 UT 52, | 19,
215 P.3d 933 ("When we interpret a contract, . . . we
determine the intent of the contracting parties by first
look[ing] to the writing alone. If the writing is
unambiguous, we determine the intent of the parties
exclusively from the plain meaning of the contractual
language.") (alteration in original) (citation footnotes
and internal quotation marks omitted); Peterson &
Simpson v. IHC Health Servs.. Inc., 2009 UT 54, f 13,
217 P.3d 716 ("As with any contract, we determine
what the parties have agreed upon by looking first to
the plain language within the four corners of the
document. When interpreting the plain language, fwe
look for a reading that harmonizes the provisions and
avoids rendering any provision meaningless.' If we
find the language unambiguous, we interpret the
contract as a matter of law.") (citations omitted). See
also Swenson v. Erickson. 2000 UT 16, If 11, 998 P.2d
807("Restrictive covenants that run with the land and
encumber subdivision lots form a contract between
subdivision property owners as a whole and individual
lot owners; therefore, interpretation of the covenants is
governed by the same rules of construction as those
used to interpret contracts."). "In interpreting contracts,
f
the ordinary and usual meaning of the words used is
given effect,'" which "ordinary meaning . . . is often
best determined through standard, non-legal
dictionaries." Warburton v. Virginia Beach Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n. 899 P.2d 779,782 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)
(citation omitted).
In this case, as in South Ridge, the relevant provisions of the Contracts are
not ambiguous. The fact that the parties may have different views about the

31

meaning of the key terms does not render the terms ambiguous. A contract term is
not ambiguous simply because one party ascribes a different meaning to it to suit
his or her own interests. (See, Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 845 P.2d
1187, 1192 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993).
The Contracts at issue in this case are undisputedly clear.

Watkins

negotiated and signed two (2) Contracts, which he acknowledged to be correct, to
purchase two (2) Ford GT 40's from HDF. The Court of Appeals, however,
proposes that the Contracts do not state what they state and proposes that since
Ford changed the designation of the Ford GT40 to the Ford GT that Watkins
should have been allowed to purchase a Ford GT from HDF. This conclusion is
in error for several reasons.
First, Watkins went to HDF specifically to purchase one or more Ford GT
40s. Watkins acknowledged that Ford built GT 40s (Trial Tr. 38:26, 39:1-2) and
that Ford could build a Ford GT 40 in the future (Trial Tr. 74:22-24). The Trial
Court found:
It was undisputed that Plaintiff specifically requested
that the Defendant sell him Ford GT 40 automobiles
and Plaintiffs request was specifically referenced in
the Contracts which were executed by the Plaintiff and
Defendant.
(Findings of Fact f 11; Trial Tr.70:5-13.)
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Second, if Watkins would have intended to by, any other vehicle, he could
have so requested that in the Contracts. Watkins testified at trial:
Q. And was there ever a period, sir, you called and
said, "I don't want to buy a Ford GT40. I want to buy
a Ford GT." The contract should be changed"?
A. No.
(Findings of Fact f22; Trial Transcript at 71:17-20.)
It is also undisputed that HDF has never had a Ford GT40.
Given the sophisticated business parties involved in these Contracts, who
are both familiar with the automobile dealing business, the Contracts should be
interpreted strictly on the plain language of the contract. ASC Utah. Inc. v. Wolf
Mountain Resorts. L.C.. 2010 UT 65, 245 P.3d 184, 193 ("Sophisticated business
parties are charged with knowledge of the terms of the contracts that they enter
into.). In fact, the Appellate Court held that the Contracts were not facially
ambiguous.

(Appellate Opinion ^fl4.)

Thus, the circumstances which the

Appellate Court claims gave rise to the latent ambiguity are not relevant to the
Contracts. Because Watkins and HDF are both sophisticated business parties, they
had the bargaining power and sophistication to include the true object of their
agreement within the language of the Contracts. If the parties intended the object
of the Contracts to be "the street-legal car produced in the likeness of the GT40

exhibited in 2002 at the Detroit Auto Show," then they could, and should, have
stated that in the writing.
The Appellate Court erred in finding a latent ambiguity in the Contracts
because "it is this court's duty to enforce the intentions of the parties as expressed
in the plain language [of a contract.]" Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807,
812 (Utah 2000). Additionally, the court is not charged with making "a better
contract for the parties than they have made for themselves."

Bakowski v.

Mountain States Steel Inc.. 2002 UT 62, 52 P.3d 1179,1185 (Wherein the court
refused to disregard a contract's plain language in order to interpret an ambiguity
into a contract which would create a "better contract than the parties had made for
themselves" just to achieve an "equitable" result.); see also E. & W. Ins Co of New
Haven. Conn v. Fidel 49 F.2d 35, 38 (10th Cir. 1931) (A strained construction will
not be resorted to in order to establish an ambiguity which does not exist.).
Whether a contractual term or provision is ambiguous is a question of law.
See Daines v. Vincent. 2008 UT 51, | 25, 190 P.3d 1269. Once the court
determines that the term or provision of a contract is facially ambiguous, it may
determine the parties' intent through examination of parol evidence, the
determination of which presents a question of fact. The trial court concluded from
the evidence and testimony presented that the language in the Contracts was clear
and unambiguous. The Utah Supreme Court addressed this subject in Cafe Rio,
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Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC. 2009 UT 6, 622 Utah Adv. Rep. 31. In Cafe
Rio, the Supreme Court set forth the guiding principles for contract interpretation,
including how to determine if ambiguity exists in a contract and when parol
evidence of intent may be considered. The court in Cafe Rio at f25 held:
Under well-accepted rules of contract interpretation,
we look to the language of the contract to determine its
meaning and the intent of the contracting parties. We
also consider each contract pro vision...in relation to all
of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all
and ignoring none. Where the language within the four
corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties'
intentions are determined from the plain meaning of
the contractual language, and the contract may be
interpreted as a matter of law. Only if the language of
the contract is ambiguous will we consider extrinsic
evidence of the parties' intent. We have explained that
ambiguity exists in a contract term or provision if it is
capable of more than one reasonable interpretation
because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms,
or other facial deficiencies.
In the present case, the first step must be to determine if the Contracts are
ambiguous, i.e., whether the contract language is "susceptible to contrary, tenable
interpretations." The Court of Appeals considered one (1) trial exhibit, which
exhibit was not testified to or about at trial, in determining that the Contracts were
ambiguous.

Although many Utah cases have stated that the parties' intent is

paramount, admission of parol evidence to determine intent is allowed only if there
is a finding of facial ambiguity. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
determined that there was no facial ambiguity in the Contracts. The term"GT 40"
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in the Contracts defines precisely what Watkins desired to purchase from HDF.
The Contracts represented what Watkins, an experienced automobile dealer,
requested. Even if the name of the vehicle changed, as alleged by the Watkins, he
did not request a modification of the Contracts to reflect a different model, though
Watkins knew he had the right to make such a request.
The Trial Court Concluded:
The Court is required to interpret the parties' contracts
based upon the plain meaning contained in the
Contracts.
The Contracts provided that defendant was to sell to
plaintiff a "Ford GT40".
Defendant has not been allocated a Ford GT 40 and, as
such, defendant did not breach the parties' Contracts
and, as such, plaintiffs Complaint must be dismissed.
(Conclusions of Lawffl[3,4, 5.)
The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that the Contracts do not state
what they state and since Ford changed the designation of the Ford GT 40 to the
Ford GT that Watkins should have been allowed to purchase a Ford GT from
HDF. The trial court held, for a number of reasons, including Watkins's own
testimony, that he specifically requested that HDF sell him Ford GT 40
automobiles and Watkins' request was specifically referenced in the Contracts.
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(Findings of Fact f l l ; Trial Tr.70:5-13.) If Watkins would have intended to by
any other vehicle, he could have so requested that in the Contracts.
Only if the language of a contract is ambiguous will extrinsic evidence of
the parties' intent be allowed. Extrinsic evidence should not be allowed to create
an ambiguity in the contract when the term "GT 40" is clear and unambiguous.
Accordingly, no facial ambiguity exists and the trial court was correct in
determining that the Contracts were clear and unambiguous as to the term of UGT
40" and the parties' intent.
The testimony at trial was a GT 40 and a GT are not the same. The vehicle
model that Watkins desired to buy, when it later became available to the public,
was the vehicle that Ford had recently introduced at the Detroit Auto Show as the
GT 40. The problem with this statement is two fold. First, as noted above, though
he alleged a name change as early as 2003, Watkins never asked to modify the
Contracts to reflect this 'new name'. Second, Watkins had already accepted his
deposit back without objection.
Third, if the model GT 40 was changed to the GT, that did not prevent Ford
from introducing a Ford GT 40 in the future, as it has done with other Ford
models. For example, Ford has designated the Ford Mustang as a "Mustang",
"Mustang GT", "Shelby", and/or "500". (Trial Tr. 74:20-24; Trial Tr. 138:1-23.)
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The Contracts reference on three (3) separate occasions within the Contract
that Watkins was obligated to purchase, and HDF was obligated to sell to Watkins,
Ford GT 40s and no other vehicle.
B.

The Contracts Executed by the Parties were Integrated
Contracts.

The integration clause demonstrates that the Contracts were a final
expression of the parties' intent. In Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren. 2008 UT
20, 182 P.3d 326,, the Utah Supreme Court reiterated that "[w]hether a contract is
integrated is a question of fact reviewed for clear error." Notwithstanding that
standard of review, the Tangren court noted that extrinsic evidence would be
allowed on the issue of integration, despite "a clear integration clause, where the
contract is alleged to be a forgery, a joke, a sham, lacking in consideration, or
where a contract is voidable for fraud, duress, mistake, or illegality."
The Tangren court further disavowed prior cases that may have allowed extrinsic
evidence outside the enumerated types of allegations, holding that "we will not
allow extrinsic evidence of a separate agreement to be considered on the question
of integration in the face of a clear integration clause."
The Contracts contain an integration clause:
Purchaser [Watkins] agrees that this contract includes
all of the terms, conditions and warranties on both the
face and reverse side hereof, that this agreement
cancels and supersedes any prior agreement and as of
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the date hereof comprises the complete and exclusive
statement of the terms of the agreement relating to the
subject matter covered hereby.
HDF and Watkins explicitly agree that the Contracts contain the entire
understanding between the parties with respect to its subject-matter. Integration
clauses, such as this one, are routinely incorporated in agreements in order to
signal to the courts that the parties agree that the contract is to be considered
completely integrated. A completely integrated agreement must be interpreted on
its face, and thus the purpose and effect of including a merger is to preclude the
subsequent introduction of evidence of preliminary negotiations or of side
agreements in a proceeding in which a court interprets the document. Ford v. Am.
Express Fin. Advisors, Inc.2004 UT 70, f 28, 98 P.3d 15 (quoting Sec. Watch.
Inc. v. Sentinel Sys.. Inc.. 176 F.3d 369, 372 (6th Cir.1999)).
In the present case, extrinsic evidence should not be allowed because the
Contracts contain a clear integration clause.
POINT IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
DETERMINED THAT HDF BREACHED THE
CONTRACTS.
The Contracts specifically provided that Watkins contracted to purchase
two (2) Ford GT40's. The Contracts in this case represented what Watkins, an
experienced automobile dealer, requested.
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Even if the name of the vehicle

changed, Watkins did not request a modification of the Contracts to reflect a
different model, though Watkins knew he had the right to make, and that he had in
the past made, such a request.
The trial court concluded:
The Court is required to interpret the parties' contracts
based upon the plain meaning contained in the
Contracts.
The Contracts provided that defendant was to sell to
plaintiff a "Ford GT40".
Defendant has not been allocated a Ford GT 40 and, as
such, defendant did not breach the parties' Contracts
and, as such, plaintiffs Complaint must be dismissed.
(Conclusions of Law ^ 3 , 4, 5.)
In this case, the Contracts are undisputedly clear.

Watkins asked to

purchase two (2) GT40's and, pursuant to Watkins' request, two (2) Contracts
were prepared, read, and signed by Watkins. The Contracts represented the parties'
bargain in every respect. Watkins testified at trial:
Q. And was there ever a period, sir, you called and
said, "I don't want to buy a Ford GT40. I want to buy
a Ford GT." The contract should be changed"?
A. No.
(Trial Tr. 71:17-20.)
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It is again important to note that Watkins acknowledged that Ford had built
a model GT40. (Trial Tr. 38:25, 39:1-2.) Watkins also acknowledged that Ford
could build a Ford GT40 in the future. (Trial Tr. 74:22-24.)
The Contracts at issue were undisputedly intended by the parties to be the
final expression of their agreement. The Contracts each provided:
Purchaser [Watkins] agrees that this contract includes
all of the terms, conditions and warranties on both the
face and reverse side hereof, that this agreement
cancels and supersedes any prior agreement and as of
the date hereof comprises the complete and exclusive
statement of the terms of the agreement relating to the
subject matter covered hereby.
The parties' failure to include the referenced terms, however, does not allow the
specific terms of the Contracts to be explained.
A.

Reasonable Time to Perform.

In an attempt to give effect to the intent of the parties, the settled rule is that
if a contract fails to specify a time of performance the law implies that it shall be
done within a reasonable time under the circumstances, and in case of controversy
that is something for the trial court to determine. Watson v. Hatch., 728 P.2d 989,
990 (Utah 1986) (citing Bradford v. Alvev & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240, 1242 (Utah
1980)); Forsgren v. Sollie. 659 P.2d 1068, 1071 (Utah 1983) (implying a
reasonable time constraint on the performance of a condition subsequent in a real
estate transfer).
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The Contracts at issue in this case fail to specify a time within which HDF
would deliver the automobiles to Watkins. Accordingly, the trial court found:
It was not until February 2004, over two years after
plaintiff accepted the return of his deposit, that
defendant learned that it would be allocated a Ford GT
based upon defendant being awarded the Share of the
Nation Award for the 2003 sales year.
(Findings of Fact 129.)
Plaintiffs demand that the Contracts be honored by
defendant over two years after plaintiff accepted a
return of his deposit is unreasonable. The Court find
that defendant returned plaintiffs check in good faith
and based upon its reasonable belief they would not be
allotted any Ford GT40's.
(Finding of Fact 141.)
Applying the aforementioned rules of contract construction to the Contracts
in this case, HDF argues that it was implied in the contract that Watkins and HDF
expected the Contracts to be completed within a few months. We can glean
Watkins1 intent from his complaint and industry standards.

At the time of

Watkins' Complaint, Watkins acknowledged that he did not "expect to receive
delivery of the Ford GT40s for many months".

(Trial Tr. 81:1-4; Watkins'

Complaint 120.) Neither Contracts specified a delivery date. (Appendix 3.)
At the end of 2002, after HDF had held Watkins' deposit for nearly ten (10)
months and after HDF had received confirmation from Ford that it would not
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receive a Ford GT40 unless it won a major Ford award (which HDF had not done
in 40+ years). On December 31, 2002, HDF prepared and mailed to Watkins a
letter in which it stated: "[ejnclosed please find a check for the refund of deposit
on your vehicle order. We regret to inform you that our allocation is not going to
allow us to receive this vehicle." Watkins did not contact HDF after receiving a
return of his deposit. (Trial Tr. 80:7-9.) Based on Watkins belief and intention
that the Contracts would be completed within a few months, he acknowledged the
return of his $2,000.00 and deposited the check into his bank account. (Trial Tr.
52:24-25.) Under the circumstances of this case the return of the deposits, which
was not objected to by Watkins, was made in reasonable time and at that time the
contracts terminated. Since the Contracts are absent any indication that Watkins
and HDF intended to hold the option open indefinitely, HDF submits that the
Contracts contemplate that HDF was free abandon the Contracts when it
understood it would not be receiving any GT 40s within a reasonable time.
B.

Meeting of the Minds.

It is fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the integral features of an
agreement is essential to the formation of a contract." Richard Barton Enters, v.
Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996). Thus, a binding contract exists where it can
be shown that the parties had a meeting of the minds as to the "integral features of
[the] agreement" and that the terms are sufficiently definite as to be capable of
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being enforced. Prince. Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young. 2004 UT 26 94 P.3d
179 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case the only meeting of the
parties' minds was Watkins agreeing to purchase, and HDF agreeing to sell, GT
40's.
Watkins and HDF were free to leave open terms in the contract, and the
conduct by both parties recognizing the existence of the Contracts is sufficient to
establish a contract for sale.
POINT V
WATKINS FAILED
DAMAGES.

TO

MITIGATE

ANY

Finally, the Appellate Court reviewed the trial court's conclusion that
Watkins' failure to mitigate any damages, which the appellate court can only
overturn if the trial court's findings of fact are "clearly erroneous." Jeffs v. Stubbs,
970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998).
The Trial Court found:
In the late summer of 2005, defendant offered to sell to
plaintiff for MSRP the Ford GT which had been
allocated to defendant.
Plaintiff refused defendant's offer to purchase a Ford
GT. Plaintiffs refusal to purchase the Ford GT
constitutes a failure of Plaintiff to mitigate his
damages.
(Findings ofFactffl[38, 39.)
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At trial, the Watkins testified:
Q. Were you offered a Ford GT from Henry S. Day?
A. Yes.
Q. When was that, sir?
A. I don't know. Sometime after this.
Q. Was it in 2005?
A. It could have been. I was offered it through my
lawyers. And I don't remember the date.
Q. Okay. Was it shortly after you went into the
dealership, sir?
A. I don't think it was shortly after, no.
Q. Within a month or two months?
A. I don't know when.
Q. What was your answer to the offer to sell you a
Ford GT, sir?
A. I declined it.
Q. And were they offering to sell it to you for MSRP?
A. Yes.
(Trial Tr. 107:1-19.)
As a general rule where a party might have avoided a particular item of
damage by reasonable effort, without undue risk, expense, or humiliation, he may
not recover for that item if he fails to make such an effort. (Restatement.2d §350.)
The Restatement continues that "if a party fails to avoid his avoidable damages,
he/she simply loses his ability to recover them". (Restatement. 2d §350, Comment
b.)
In Utah, damages awarded for breach of contract should place the non
breaching party in as good a position as if the contract had been performed.
However, the non breaching party has an active duty to mitigate his damages, and
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he may not, either by action or inaction, aggravate the injury occasioned by the
breach. Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, P31, 990 P.2d 933. In order to satisfy
the duty to mitigate damages, a non breaching party must make "reasonable efforts
and expenditures." Madsen v. Murrev & Sons Co.. 743 P.2d 1212, 1214 (Utah
1987) (quotations and citations omitted); see Angelos v In. First Interstate Bank of
Utah, 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983) (stating that mitigation of damages requires
non breaching party to avoid damages by "reasonable means").
In this case, Watkins was offered the vehicle that he indicated he wanted to
purchase for MSRP.

Watkins declined to purchase the vehicle and thereby,

effectively, failed to mitigate his damages. The finding by the Trial Court is
supported by the undisputed facts and Watkins's appeal should be summarily
dismissed. Thus, the Appellate Court erred when it overturned the trial court's
factual findings as to Watkins' failure to mitigate.
POINT VI
HENRY DAY FORD IS ENTITLED TO
RECOVER ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
COSTS.
In Utah, attorney's fees are awardable only if authorized by statute or by
contract. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). The
Contracts provided:
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In the event it becomes necessary for Seller to enforce
any of the terms, conditions or warranties in this
agreement, Purchaser agrees to pay reasonable
attorney's fees, court costs, and collection fees.
(Trial Exhibits 1-4; Appendices 1-2.)
Utah Code Ann. §78B-5-826 provides:
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either
party that prevails in a civil action based upon any
promissory note, written contract, or other writing
executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of
the promissory note, written contract, or other writing
allow at least one party to recover attorney's fees.
Pursuant to the Contracts, HDF was entitled to an award of its attorney's
fees and costs.
Clearly, the award of attorney's fees and costs by the trial court is supported
by the Contracts and HDF should be awarded its attorney's fees and costs incurred
on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based upon testimony and evidence presented at trial, the Trial Court
concluded:
The Contracts are clear and unambiguous and were
intended to be the final and complete expression of the
parties' bargains.

47

The Contracts between the parties are integrated
agreements.
The Court finds the parties abandoned the Contracts.
Defendant did not breach the parties' Contracts and, as
such, plaintiffs Complaint must be dismissed.
Defendant is awarded its reasonable attorney's fees
and costs in an amount to be proven by Affidavit.
(Conclusions of Law ^[1, 2, 9, 11, 12; Appendix 3.)
The Trial Court's decisions were each supported by the evidence and the
law.

Based upon the foregoing, Henry Day Ford requests this Court affirm the

trial court's dismissal of Watkins' Complaint and award of attorney's fees and
costs to Henry Day Ford. Henry Day Ford further requests that Henry Day Ford
be awarded its attorney's fees and costs incurred on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of April, 2011.

ROBERT WrHUGHES
Attorney for Henry Day Ford
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DAVIS, Presiding Judge:
Hi
Plaintiff Tom Watkins appeals the judgment of the trial
court resolving his contractual dispute with Defendant Henry Day
Ford (Henry Day). Watkins argues that the trial court erred in
several respects in its decision. We reverse and remand for
further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
f2
At the North American Auto Show in January 2002, Ford Motor
Company (Ford) unveiled a GT4 0 concept car, which was designed to
resemble the legendary race car of the same name that had
achieved great success in the 1960s. When the concept car
received an extremely positive reception at the auto show, Ford
announced that it would commence production of a street-legal
version of the car. When Watkins, the owner of a non-Ford auto
dealership, became aware of this, he tried to find a Ford
dealership that would take his order for one of the newlyannounced cars. After some searching, Watkins met with a
representative of Henry Day in early March 2002, who ultimately

told Watkins that if Henry Day was allocated such cars, it would
be willing to sell two of them to Watkins.
1(3
Watkins and Henry Day then entered into two contracts
finalizing their agreement. One contract provided for the sale
of the first GT4 0 Henry Day received and the other provided for
the sale of the second GT4 0 received. At this time, Watkins gave
Henry Day a check for $2000, which represented a $1000 down
payment on each of the anticipated cars. The contracts were
amended the following day to show that the agreed-upon purchase
price for the cars was the manufacturer's suggested retail price
(MSRP). Because the parties did not know when the cars would be
produced, there was no model year or delivery date specified in
the contracts. And because it was uncertain whether Henry Day
would even receive one of the cars, the parties understood that
the receipt of the cars was a condition precedent to the
obligations to buy and sell under the contracts, although this
understanding was not incorporated into the language of the
contracts.
f4
Several months later, in December 2 0 02, Henry Day's general
manager called a Ford representative to determine whether Henry
Day would be allocated any of the GT40s. Ford's response was
that the only way Henry Day would be allocated any GT40s was by
winning certain company awards, which awards Henry Day had never
before won in its forty-year history. Thus, Henry Day,
considering it quite unlikely that it would receive any GT40s,
decided to return Watkins's deposit to him. In a letter dated
December 31, 2002, Henry Day told Watkins, "We regret to inform
you that our allocation is not going to allow us to receive this
vehicle," and included a $2000 check for the refund of Watkins's
deposit. Watkins negotiated the check without objection or any
further discussion of the matter with Henry Day representatives.
f5
At some point thereafter, it became clear that Ford would be
calling the newly-announced car simply the GT and not the GT40.
Several new GTs were manufactured in time for and used during
Ford's centennial celebration in June 2003. But the first of the
new cars sold to the public was a 2005 model, sold in August 2003
and delivered in late 2004.
f6
Notwithstanding Henry Day's prior award history, the
dealership did receive awards for the years 2003 and 2004 that
ultimately resulted in Henry Day receiving three Ford GTs. The
first car was allocated in December 2004 and the second was
allocated in May 2005, the cars having MSRPs of $156,595 and
$156,945, respectively. Shortly after the second allocation, one
of Watkins's employees told Watkins that she had heard that Henry
Day had received two Ford GTs. Watkins immediately went to the
dealership, checkbook in hand, and insisted that Henry Day abide
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by the parties' contracts and sell him the two Ford GTs for MSRP.
Henry Day's representative refused, insisting that the contracts
were no longer in force, and offered to instead sell Watkins one
of the cars for $250,000. Watkins refused the offer.
fl7 Watkins filed suit against Henry Day in the beginning of
July 2005 for breach of contract. Toward the end of the summer
of 2005, Henry Day eventually offered to sell Watkins a Ford GT
for MSRP. Watkins, who argues that the market value of the cars
had "dropped significantly" by this time, refused Henry Day's
offer.
1(8
The case ultimately proceeded to a bench trial. The trial
court ruled in Henry Day's favor, determining that (1) there was
no breach of contract because the contracts unambiguously
provided for the sale of GT4 0s and Henry Day never received any
such cars, (2) Watkins had abandoned the contracts and waived his
rights thereunder when he negotiated the $2000 check refunding
his deposit, and (3) Watkins had failed to mitigate his damages
when he refused Henry Day's eventual offer to sell one of the
Ford GTs for MSRP. And due to Henry Day's prevailing on the
issues, the trial court awarded Henry Day its reasonable attorney
fees and costs in accordance with the terms of the contracts.
Watkins now appeals the trial court's determinations.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
f9
Watkins first argues that the trial court erred in
determining that the contracts between the parties were not
ambiguous and in interpreting those unambiguous terms of the
contracts. These are both questions of law that we review for
correctness. See Home Sav. & Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817
P.2d 341, 347 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("The interpretation of a
contract normally presents a question of law. . . . The question
of whether a contract provision is ambiguous, i.e., susceptible
to two or more reasonable interpretations, is also a question of
law.").
if 10 Watkins next argues that the trial court erred when it
determined that by negotiating the $2000 check from Henry Day, he
abandoned the contracts and waived his rights thereunder. "Where
there is dispute as to whether [abandonment] has occurred, it is
usually a question of fact, to be determined from the
circumstances of the particular case . . . ." Timpanogos
Highlands, Inc. v. Harper, 544 P.2d 481, 484 (Utah 1975)
(footnote omitted). Thus, "we do not reverse unless we are
persuaded that the evidence clearly preponderates against the
findings." Id. Likewise, "the actions or events allegedly
supporting waiver are factual in nature and should be reviewed as
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factual determinations, to which we give a district court
deference." Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, 1 16, 982 P.2d
572.
H11 Finally, Watkins argues that the trial court erred in
determining that he failed to mitigate any damages. " [W]e review
a trial court's conclusions as to the legal effect of a given set
of found facts for correctness." Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234,
1244 (Utah 1998).
ANALYSIS
I.

Ambiguity

Hl2 The trial court determined that the contracts at issue here
are "clear and unambiguous and were intended to be a final and
complete expression of the parties' bargain."1 The trial court
therefore determined that because each contract was facially
unambiguous, providing specifically for the sale of a Ford GT40,
this was the exact name of the car that was to be provided under
the contracts and that because Henry Day never received any
vehicles bearing that exact name, it did not breach the
contracts.
1Jl3 The Utah Supreme Court has established "a two-part standard
for determining facial ambiguity." Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT
51, f 26, 190 P.3d 1269. First, the trial court must determine
whether the contract is facially ambiguous. See id.
When determining whether a contract is
ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be
x

It seems that the trial court relied in part on the
integrated nature of the contracts in making its determination.
Similarly, Henry Day relies on the integration clause of the
contracts to argue that extrinsic evidence may not be considered
in the ambiguity determination. Although we agree with the trial
court and Henry Day that the contracts are integrated, this
conclusion does not have the result that Henry Day suggests. It
is true that "in the face of a clear integration clause,
extrinsic evidence of a separate oral agreement is not admissible
on the question of integration." Tangren Family Trust v.
Tangren, 2008 UT 20, f 17, 182 P.3d 326 (emphasis added). But
the question of integration is merely the first step in the
analysis, after which we proceed to the question of whether there
is an ambiguity in the contracts, see id. f 18, which exercise,
as we discuss in our analysis above, allows resort to some
extrinsic evidence.

considered. Otherwise, the determination of
ambiguity is inherently one-sided, namely, it
is based solely on the extrinsic evidence of
the judge's own linguistic education and
experience. Although the terms of an
instrument may seem clear to a particular
reader--including a judge--this does not rule
out the possibility that the parties chose
the language of the agreement to express a
different meaning. A judge should therefore
consider any credible evidence offered to
show the parties' intention.
While there is Utah case law that
espouses a stricter application of the rule
and would restrict a determination of whether
ambiguity exists to a judge's determination
of the meaning of the terms of the writing
itself, the better-reasoned approach is to
consider the writing in light of the
surrounding circumstances. Rational
interpretation requires at least a
preliminary consideration of all credible
evidence offered to prove the intention of
the parties . . . so that the court can place
itself in the same situation in which the
parties found themselves at the time of
contracting.
Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah
1995) (omission in original) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). Second, after considering evidence of ambiguity,
the trial court "must ensure that the interpretations contended
for are reasonably supported by the language of the contract."
Daines, 2008 UT 51, f 26 (internal quotation marks omitted). If
they are, "then extrinsic evidence is admissible to clarify the
ambiguous terms"; otherwise, "the parties' intentions must be
determined solely from the language of the contract." Ward, 907
P.2d at 268.
fll4 We agree with the trial court that there exists no facial
ambiguity in either of the contracts at issue here. When we
look, as we must, to the evidence presented regarding the facts
known to the parties and the circumstances present at the time
the parties were contracting, it is clear that the parties' use
of the term GT40 is susceptible to only one interpretation and
was intended to represent only one thing. Considering that Ford
had just recently made the announcement regarding the production
of a street-legal version of the GT40 and that this prompted

c;

Watkins's search for a dealership that would sell him one,2 it is
obvious that this is the type of car for which the parties were
contracting. Indeed, the Henry Day representative who signed the
contracts testified to this effect, stating unequivocally and
repeatedly that he shared Watkins's understanding regarding the
model of car being discussed:
Q. Now the cars that were the subject
of this contract were brand new product, were
they not?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, you understood that the
automobiles that were the subject of these
contracts [were] the yet to be produced Ford
GT concept car or the GT40 as it was called
at that time, correct?
A. Correct.
The evidence of the circumstances surrounding the contract
formation and the situation of the parties at the time of
contract formation simply does not indicate any other
understanding on the part of either party.3 And the
2

Henry Day objects to the various published articles
submitted by Watkins to show that the announcement made regarding
the GT4 0 was made just prior to the parties having entered into
the contracts and to show that the name of that announced car was
ultimately changed to the GT. Henry Day correctly states that
nearly all of these articles are not part of the record below and
that we therefore may not rely upon those articles on appeal, see
In re L.M., 2001 UT App 314, f 16 n.3, 37 P.3d 1188 ("Our policy
has long been, and continues to be, we will not consider new
evidence on appeal." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
However, one of the articles was offered as an exhibit below and
we rely on information gleaned from it. Although Henry Day
asserts that this exhibit "was found to be hearsay and was not
supported by any other credible evidence," this is a gross
misrepresentation of what actually occurred. In fact, Henry Day
stipulated to the admission of this exhibit at trial and in no
way objected to it at any point in the proceedings. Simply
because Henry Day successfully objected to one question asked of
a witness that may have elicited some of the same information as
contained in the exhibit, that does not support the assertion
that this exhibit was found to be hearsay.
3

Henry Day adamantly argues that we may not consider any
evidence of the parties' intent outside the four corners of the
(continued...)
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understanding that the use of the term GT4 0 referenced the newlyannounced street-legal version of the GT4 0 is certainly supported
by the language of the contracts. When the parties chose the
term GT4 0, it was unambiguous and meant just that--the parties
were contracting for the sale of what was then known as the GT40.
Thus, the use of the term GT4 0 does not render the contracts
facially ambiguous just because the car model ultimately produced
was named simply the GT.
^| 15 Although we have determined that in looking at the face of
the contracts there is no ambiguity with regard to the term GT40,
our inquiry does not necessarily end there:
Under Utah law, if the initial review of the
plain language of a contract, within its four
corners, reveals no patently obvious
ambiguities, the inquiry into whether an
ambiguity exists in a contract does not
always end there. Utah's rules of contract
interpretation allow courts to consider any
relevant evidence to determine whether a
latent ambiguity exists in contract terms
that otherwise appear to be unambiguous.
Gillmor v. Macev, 2005 UT App 351, % 35, 121 P.3d 57. A latent
ambiguity is " [a]n ambiguity that does not readily appear in the
language of a document, but instead arises from a collateral
matter when the document's terms are applied or executed."
Black's Law Dictionary 93 (9th ed. 2009) . Thus, if a contract,
"while on its face appearing to be certain, would open up an
ambiguity when attempts were made to apply it to the subjectmatter, then such ambiguity could be resolved by evidence of what
meaning the parties themselves intended to invest such terms."
Bamberger Co. v. Certified Prods., Inc., 88 Utah 194, 48 P.2d
489, 494 (1935) ; see also Fox Film Corp. v. Ocrden Theatre Co., 82
Utah 279, 17 P.2d 294, 296 (1932) ("One well-recognized exception
to the [parol evidence] rule is that extrinsic evidence, parol or
otherwise, is admissible to explain a latent ambiguity in a
writing. This does not mean that terms or conditions may be
inserted into or taken out of the writing by direct oral
assertions, but it does mean that the court may receive evidence
of such surrounding facts as will enable it to look upon the
transaction through the eyes of the parties thereto and thereby

3

(...continued)
contracts. As we set forth above, this is contrary to the law,
which requires us to first look at the circumstances surrounding
contract formation in determining whether there is an ambiguity.
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know what they understood or intended the ambiguous word or
provisions to mean.").
fl6 We determine that there is a latent ambiguity in the
contracts at issue here, created by Ford's later decision to name
the anticipated car the GT instead of the GT40.4 We thus look to
the same evidence of surrounding circumstances as we did above to
determine what car the parties intended to buy and sell. Again,
it is clear that the parties meant the same thing with their
reference to the GT40. And thus, taking the contract term GT40
to reference this car of a slightly different name accomplishes
the concordant intent that the parties had when contracting, that
is, it provides for the sale of two of the cars that Ford
announced and produced on the heels of the GT4 0 concept car that
was unveiled at the 2 0 02 auto show. Because Henry Day received
three such cars and did not sell two to Watkins for MSRP, Henry
Day breached the contracts--assuming they had not been abandoned
and that Watkins had not waived his rights thereunder.
II.

Abandonment/Waiver

fl7 The trial court determined that Watkins had abandoned the
contracts and waived his rights thereunder by his acceptance of
Henry Day's return of his deposit. Waiver and abandonment
involve the intentional relinquishment of a known right. See
Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'nf 857 P.2d 935,
942 (Utah 1993) ("A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a
known right. To constitute waiver, there must be an existing
right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an
intention to relinquish it. We further clarify that the intent
4

Henry Day somewhat disingenuously argues that it is not
clear that there was a name change from the GT40 to the GT and
that they could be references to different cars. However, we see
ample evidence of this name change. First, there is the article
before the trial court that calls the concept car the GT40 and
calls the production model based thereon the GT. While Henry Day
argues that the article uses the terms GT40 and GT
"interchangeably," we think that the article doing so would be
even more of an indication that the two terms reference the same
car. Second, Henry Day's general manager testified that although
he was not personally certain, he believed that the GT had
earlier been introduced as the GT40 and that the evidence showed
that. Third, the findings of fact state that in December 2002,
Henry Day's general manager called its Ford representative, who
said that Henry Day would not "be allotted any Ford GT 40's
unless [Henry Day] won [certain awards]."
(Emphasis added.) But
when Henry Day went on to win three of those specified awards, it
was allocated three Ford GTs.
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to relinquish a right must be distinct." (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)); Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755
P.2d 750, 753 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("Abandonment means the
intentional relinquishment of one's rights in the contract; and
in order to nullify such rights, there must be a clear and
unequivocal showing of such abandonment."). There is simply no
intentional relinquishment of a known right in this case.
1[l8 The trial court determined that Watkins demonstrated an
intentional relinquishment of his known rights when he negotiated
the check returning his deposit "without reservation or
objection," particularly in light of Watkins's "experience in the
auto dealership industry and both parties' uncertainty as to when
and if defendant would receive the contracted vehicles." But
even considering both Watkins's experience in the industry-assuming such experience was even relevant to the circumstances
of this transaction--and the parties' initial uncertainty as to
whether Henry Day would receive the subject cars, there is simply
no evidence whatsoever indicating that Watkins knew he still had
rights under the contracts at the time he negotiated the check
refunding his deposit. The letter accompanying the check was an
unequivocal representation by Henry Day that its prior
uncertainty regarding allocation had been resolved and that it
now knew it would not be receiving any of the subject cars. Had
this representation been true, then the parties would have known
that a condition precedent to the contracts was definitely not
going to happen and they therefore would no longer have had any
rights or obligations under the contracts.5 See Harper v. Great
Salt Lake Council, Inc., 1999 UT 34, % 14, 976 P.2d 1213 ("Under
well-established principles of contract interpretation, where the
duty of the obligor to perform is contingent upon the occurrence
or existence of a condition precedent, the obligee may not
require performance by the obligor, because the obligor's duty,
and conversely the obligee's right to demand performance, does
not arise until that condition occurs or exists. Failure of a
material condition precedent relieves the obligor of any duty to
5

In its ambiguity argument, Henry Day argued that Watkins
should have requested that the contracts be modified when he
discovered that the cars would be released under the name GT as
opposed to GT40. Even if we were somehow convinced that Watkins
would be under such a burden, Henry Day's argument is unavailing.
The name modification apparently occurred subsequent to the
letter informing Watkins that the condition precedent in the
contracts would not occur. Thus, after receiving this letter,
Watkins would have justifiably thought he no longer had any
rights under the contracts and would have had no reason to
attempt to modify the contractual terms to reflect the name
change.

9

perform." (citation omitted)). See generally McBride-Williams v.
Huard, 2004 UT 21, f 13, 94 P.3d 175 ("'Condition precedent' is
defined as 'an act or event, other than a lapse of time, that
must exist or occur before a duty to perform something promised
arises.'" (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 289 (7th ed. 1999))).
i|l9 Henry Day seems to argue that notwithstanding the
unequivocal representation regarding the condition precedent,
Watkins was still required to object to the refund of his deposit
to preserve his contractual rights. But we have been referred to
no legal authority for this position and can conceive of no
policy reason requiring Watkins to distrust Henry Day's
representation. There was nothing that would have given Watkins
any reason to doubt the accuracy or truth of the information
relayed by Henry Day. And the crucial information regarding
nonoccurrence of the condition precedent is something that
Watkins had no way of independently verifying.6 Under these
circumstances, there was simply no relinquishment by Watkins of a
known right, and we reverse the trial court on this issue.7
Because we have determined that Henry Day breached the contracts
and that Watkins did not abandon the contracts or waive his
rights thereunder, we remand to the trial court for a
determination of the damages to be awarded to Watkins for Henry
Day's breach of the contracts.

6

Indeed, if we were to impose the burden on Watkins that
Henry Day suggests, it appears that in order to ensure he did not
abandon his rights under the contracts Watkins would have had to
wait until the entire production run of the Ford GTs had been
completed and all the cars were delivered to dealerships before
negotiating the $2 000 check. He would simply have no other way
to know with certainty of the failure of the condition precedent
of the contracts.
7

The trial court made a finding that Henry Day "returned
[Watkins]'s check in good faith and based upon the reasonable
belief they would not be allotted any Ford GT 40's." But whether
Henry Day was acting in good faith by making an educated guess is
irrelevant--it does not change the information actually given to
Watkins, which information tells us whether Watkins was
relinquishing a known right.
Further, notwithstanding any good faith, the unequivocal
statement from Henry Day was simply incorrect. See generally 31
C.J.S. Estoppel & Waiver § 218 (2008) ("A waiver may not be
claimed by one whose false representation is the foundation of
the waiver."). Henry Day knew that there existed some
possibility, no matter how slim, that Henry Day would get one of
the subject cars.
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III.

Failure to Mitigate

^|20 " [U] nder the doctrine of avoidable consequences the
nonbreaching party has an active duty to mitigate his damages,
and he may not, either by action or inaction, aggravate the
injury occasioned by the breach." Mahmood v. Ross (In re Estate
of Ross), 1999 UT 104, 1 31, 990 P.2d 933 (internal quotation
marks omitted).8 Although Watkins may have had the opportunity
and duty to mitigate his damages here, there are not sufficient
factual findings by the trial court to support such a conclusion;
most importantly, there is no finding as to the actual value of
the GT at the time Henry Day eventually offered to sell it to
Watkins for MSRP. The lack of findings is probably largely due
to the fact that the trial court determined there had been no
breach of the contracts and therefore never arrived at a
determination of damages. We therefore must vacate the trial
court's ruling respecting Watkins's failure to mitigate and
remand to the trial court to revisit this issue. On remand, the
trial court should make the findings necessary to determine
whether Watkins failed to mitigate his damages, including a
determination of the value of the subject cars at the time Henry
Day offered to sell one to Watkins at MSRP in the late summer of
2005 and whether it would have resulted in a financial benefit to
Watkins.
IV.

Attorney Fees

if21 The contracts at issue provided that Henry Day was entitled
to recover "reasonable attorney[] fees, court costs, and
collection fees" should it need to enforce the contracts. And
the Utah Code provides a reciprocal right to recover attorney
fees:
A court may award costs and attorney
fees to either party that prevails in a civil
action based upon any promissory note,
written contract, or other writing executed
after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of
the promissory note, written contract, or
other writing allow at least one party to
recover attorney fees.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 (2008) . The trial court awarded Henry
Day its reasonable attorney fees and costs due to its prevailing
It is Henry Day that bears the burden "to prove with
reasonable certainty" the amounts that were made or could have
been made in mitigation. See Pratt v. Board of Educ., 564 P.2d
294, 297-98 (Utah 1977) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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status below. But because we determine that Watkins has
prevailed on his breach of contract claims, we reverse the award
of attorney fees and costs to Henry Day and remand for the trial
court to enter an appropriate award of attorney fees and costs in
favor of Watkins, including those fees and costs reasonably
incurred on appeal.
CONCLUSION
if22 First, we determine that the trial court was correct that
there was no facial ambiguity in the contracts at issue here.
However, we determine the later renaming of the car created a
latent ambiguity. We therefore consider evidence of the intent
of the parties at the time of contracting and determine that the
parties intended to buy and sell what is now referred to as a
Ford GT, and thus, Henry Day breached the contracts by refusing
to sell such cars upon receipt to Watkins for MSRP. Second, we
reverse the trial court on the issue of abandonment and waiver
because the facts simply do not support the determination that
Watkins was intentionally relinquishing any known right. Thus,
we remand to the trial court for a determination of the amount of
damages to be awarded to Watkins. Third, the trial court did not
make findings necessary to determine whether the facts here show
a failure by Watkins to mitigate his damages. We therefore
vacate the trial court's mitigation determination and remand to
the trial court for further consideration of this matter.
Finally, in light of the outcome on appeal, we reverse the award
of attorney fees and costs in favor of Henry Day and remand for
the trial court to determine an appropriate award of attorney
fees and costs to Watkins.

James Z. Davis,
Presiding Judge

f23

I CONCUR:

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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THORNE, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part):
il24 I concur in the analysis of Parts I and III of the majority
opinion. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority's
reversal of the trial court's abandonment determination in Part
II and therefore dissent from Part IV as well. I do not agree
with the majority's determination that Watkins's negotiation of
the return of deposit check was not an intentional relinquishment
of his contractual rights. See supra f 19.
if25 The contracts entered into between the parties gave Watkins
a right to purchase two of the subject cars contingent upon
allocation of the cars to Henry Day. However, "[a] contract may
be [abandoned] by acts or conduct of the parties inconsistent
with the continued existence of the contract." Harris v. IES
Assocs. , Inc. , 2003 UT App 112, i| 37, 69 P.3d 297 (second
alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). In
this case, both parties undertook acts inconsistent with the
continued existence of the contracts.9
i[26 Henry Day acted inconsistently with the contracts when it
refunded the deposit Watkins gave as security for the performance
of the contracts. Watkins acted inconsistently when he accepted
the return of his deposit and negotiated the deposit check.
These actions demonstrate the parties' unequivocal expressions of
an intent to abandon the contracts. If Watkins, after receiving
the refund check and letter from Henry Day indicating its desire
to abandon the contracts, wanted to maintain rights under the
contracts, he should not have taken actions that were
inconsistent with the continued existence of the contracts.
Instead of either seeking a clarification or asserting ongoing
rights, Watkins negotiated the deposit check. The result was
that both parties acted as if the contracts had been rescinded.
i|27 Watkins's negotiation of the deposit check indicated his
agreement to "walk away" from the deal and abandon the contracts.
By negotiating the returned deposit check, Watkins released Henry
Day of its obligation to sell any future allocation of the
subject cars to Watkins and Henry Day relinquished its right to
enforce purchase at the manufacturer's suggested retail price
9

It is possible that the parties' actions of mutual
abandonment of the contracts in this case may amount to a
manifestation of mutual assent to rescind the contracts. See
generally Forsyth v. Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah 1980)
(per curiam) ("[W]hen the intent to abandon by one party is
coupled with the equal intention of the other party, such mutual
abandonment may under certain circumstances, be found to
constitute rescission of the contract.").

i7

(MSRP) of the cars if they were allocated to Henry Day. The
issuance of the deposit check and Watkins's negotiation of the
check without any visible attempt to claim continuing rights
demonstrated an unequivocal representation of intent to abandon
the contracts. See generally Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark,
755 P.2d 750, 753 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (stating that abandonment
is the intentional relinquishment of one's right in the
contract). Because Watkins abandoned the contracts, I would not
permit Watkins to enforce the sale of the subject cars pursuant
to those contracts. Likewise, if the situation were reversed and
Henry Day was attempting to enforce the sale of the subject cars,
for example if the market value dropped significantly below MSRP
before delivery of the cars to Henry Day, I would not likewise
permit Henry Day to enforce the contracts.
f28 I also do not agree with the majority opinion that Watkins
could not have relinquished his rights because Watkins was
unaware, after Henry Day's negative representation regarding
allocation, that there remained a possibility that Henry Day
would receive an allocation of the subject cars if the dealership
received a sales award. See supra f 19. Under the contracts,
Watkins had a contingent right to purchase the subject cars
regardless of how likely or unlikely the possibility of Henry
Day's allocation might be at any given time throughout the
duration of the contracts. Henry Day's desire to abandon the
contracts based on its own belief that it would not receive an
allocation did nothing to change Watkins's contingent contractual
rights. Thus, the parties' beliefs regarding the probability
that Henry Day would receive an allocation of the subject cars is
irrelevant. At the time Watkins received the refund check, he
had a contingent right to purchase the subject cars if. later
allocated to Henry Day. Watkins, however, relinquished his
contractual rights when he negotiated the return of deposit
check.
H29 Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court's abandonment
determination.

William A. Thorne Jr., Judge
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MAY - 5 2009
SALT LAKE COUNTV

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TOM WATKINS, an individual,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 050911728

HENRY DAY FORD, a Utah corporation,

Judge Tyrone E. Medley

Defendant.
The above-entitled matter having come before this Court for trial on March 3, 2009, the
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, presiding. Plaintiff was present and represented by his attorneys, John
B. Wilson and John P. Ball. Defendant was represented by its attorney, Robert W. Hughes. The
Court having heard the argument of counsel, received evidence and testimony, reviewed the
pleadings and papersfiledin this matter, including supplemental Memoranda submitted on or about
March 9, 2009, and good cause appearing therefore, now enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff has been an owner of one or more motor vehicle dealerships since 1989 and

has been involved in the retail automobile business in various capacities since 1968.
2.

In 2002 Ford announced that it was going to build the Ford GT 40.

3.

Also on March 2,2002, plaintiff offered to pay defendant $ 1,000.00 for each vehicle

as a down payment.
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FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

At the time plaintiff met with Mr. Kersey, defendant did not have any GT 40's in its

inventory.
5.

The first meeting between Mr. Kersey and the plaintiff lasted about 15 minutes.

During the meeting Mr. Kersey did not leave, nor did Mr. Kersey speak with anyone else about the
plaintiffs requested purchase.
6.

Mr. Kersey during this meeting indicated to the plaintiff that he would have to speak

with the General Manager of defendant when he returned to work on Monday to obtain permission
to accept plaintiffs offer to purchase two (2) GT 40 automobiles.
7.

The following Monday Steve Kersey did meet with the General Manager and inquired

whether he could enter into the transaction to sell two (2) Ford GT 40's to the plaintiff.
8.

Though defendant did not have any GT 40fs on its lot, nor did the dealership know

if it would be allocated any GT 40!s to sell, at that time Mr. Kersey was given permission to enter
into a contracts) to sell plaintiff Ford GT 40 automobiles, if such vehicles were allotted to
defendant.
9.

Mr. Kersey called the plaintiff the following Monday and indicated that defendant

would sell the plaintiff two (2) GT 40 automobiles if defendant was allocated the vehicles.
10.

Later that same Monday, the plaintiff came to the defendant's location and Mr.

Kersey prepared two (2) written Motor Vehicle Contracts of Sale (the "Contracts"), dated March 4,
2002, for Ford GT 40 automobiles.

WATKINS V. HENRY DAY FORD
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It was undisputed that plaintiff specifically requested that defendant sell him Ford GT

40 automobiles and plaintiffs request was specifically referenced in the Contracts which were
executed by the plaintiff and defendant.
12.

Mr. Kersey's meeting on March 4,2002 with Mr. Watkins lasted approximately 15

minutes during which time Mr. Kersey again did not leave the room where he and Mr. Watkins were
meeting and again he did not speak to anyone regarding whether defendant would be allocated any
Ford GT 40's.
13.

Plaintiff reviewed the Contracts which specified that the automobile to be purchased

by plaintiff was a Ford "GT 40", found them to be accurate, and signed both written Contracts, as
did Mr. Kersey on behalf of defendant.
14.

The plaintiff offered to pay a deposit for each GT 40 and the defendant required a

deposit of $1,000.00 before the contract would be prepared.
15.

The plaintiff did tender to the defendant $1,000.00 for each automobile and the

defendant did accept plaintiffs deposit.
16.

Each Contract specified a down payment in the amount of $ 1,000.00.

17.

Each of the Contracts also provided in the "memo" portion of the Contract as

follows: "MEMO: deposits on GT40".
18.

None of the Contracts executed by the parties specified a delivery date. At the time

the parties executed the Contracts, defpndant was uncertain as to when or if it would receive the Ford
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GT 40's. PlaintifFbelieved at the time the Contracts were executed that it could take as long as two
years for defendant to receive the Ford GT 40's.
19.

The following day the plaintiff called Mr. Kersey and indicated that he wanted the

Contracts modified to include the purchase price was for MSRP.
20.

The plaintiff did not indicate in this later call in which he requested the Contracts be

modified that the Contracts were in error or needed any further modifications.
21.

Mr. Kersey included the requested language in the Contracts and faxed the Contracts

as modified to the plaintiff.
22.

At no time in 2002 did plaintiff ask to purchase a Ford GT from defendant.

23.

At the end of 2002, after defendant had held plaintiffs deposit for over eight months,

Jeremy Day inquired why plaintiffs deposit was being held since there had been no indication that
the defendant would be allocated any Ford GT 40!s.
24.

Jeremy Day, in December of 2002, called the defendant's Ford representative to

inquire if defendant would be allotted any Ford GT 40's.
25.

Ford indicated to Mr. Day, in effect, that the defendant was not, as a smaller Ford

dealer going to be allotted any Ford GT 40's unless the defendant won the Ford President's Award
or Ford's National Car and Truck Share Award.
26.

Defendant had never, in its 40 year history, received either the President's Award or

National Share Award from Ford.
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Based upon the fact that defendant would not be allocated a Ford GT40 to sell, the

defendant, on December 31,2002, returned plaintiffs $2,000.00 deposit with a letter which stated:
"[ejnclosed pleasefinda check for the refund of deposit on your vehicle order. We regret to inform
you that our allocation is not going to allow us to receive this vehicle."
28.

Though plaintiff, as noted above is an experienced automobile dealer and as such

would be very familiar with industry practices, he negotiated the return of his deposit without
objection or reservation of any type. Based upon plaintiffs experience in the auto dealership
industry, plaintiffs claim that he deposited the check because he did not know what to do with the
check lacks credibility. Plaintiff made no attempt whatsoever to communicate any concerns he had
with the letter and the check, nor made any attempts within a reasonable time of receiving the letter
and check to assert or enforce his contract rights.
29.

It was not until February 2004, over two years after plaintiff accepted the return of

his deposit, that defendant learned that it would be allocated a Ford GT based upon defendant being
awarded the Share of the Nation Award for the 2003 sales year.
30.

In April 2004, defendant was notified by Ford that it would be receiving the

President's Award based upon defendant's 2003 automobile sales and would be allocated another
Ford GT.
31.

Ford invoiced defendant for the first Ford GT on December 9,2004.
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Defendant received actual delivery of the December 9, 2004 invoiced Ford GT on

May 31,2005.
33.

Ford invoiced defendant for the second Ford GT on May 31, 2005.

34.

The Ford GT represented in the May 31, 2005 was not available for delivery until

July 20, 2005
35.

In June of 2005 the plaintiff for the first time demanded defendant sell him aFord GT

model vehicle even though the plaintiff had contracted to purchase Ford GT 40 vehicles and plaintiff
had accepted without objection the return of his deposit.
36.

Defendant refused to sell to plaintiff in June of 2005 a Ford GT vehicle.

37.

In or about the summer of 2005, defendant was informed by Ford that it would be

allocated a Ford GT.
38.

In the late summer of 2005, defendant offered to sell to plaintiff for MSRP the Ford

GT which had been allocated to defendant.
39.

Plaintiff refused defendant's offer to purchase a Ford GT. Plaintiffs refusal to

purchase the Ford GT constitutes a failure of plaintiff to mitigate his damages.
40.

Plaintiff, by his acceptance of his deposit without reservation, objection, or condition,

unequivocally demonstrated his abandonment of the Contracts.
41.

Plaintiffs demand that the Contracts be honored by defendant over two (2) years after

plaintiff accepted a return of his deposit is unreasonable. The Court finds that defendant returned
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plaintiffs check in good faith and based upon the reasonable belief they would not be allotted any
FordGT40's.
42.

Plaintiff, by his actions, unequivocally demonstrated his intent to relinquish his rights

to purchase the subject vehicles from defendant.
The Court having made and entered the foregoing Findings of Fact, now makes the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Contracts are clear and unambiguous and were intended to be the final and

complete expression of the parties' bargain.
2.

The Contracts between the parties are integrated agreements.

3.

The Court is required to interpret the parties' contracts based upon the plain meaning

contained in the Contracts.
4.

The Contracts provided that defendant was to sell to plaintiff a "Ford GT 40".

5.

Defendant has not been allocated a Ford GT 40 and, as such, defendant did not breach

the parties' Contracts and, as such, plaintiff's Complaint must be dismissed.
6.

The Contracts specifically provide that plaintiff contracted to purchase two (2) "Ford

GT 40" automobiles. Plaintiff now claims that he contracted to purchase Ford GT automobiles,
which claim differs from the actual Contracts.
7.

Plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance of the Contracts.
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Defendant's return of plaintiff s deposit represented conduct inconsistent with the

continued existence of the Contract, and plaintiffs negotiation of defendant's check in the amount
of $2,000.00 without reservation or objection constituted conduct inconsistent with the continued
existence of the Contract after the plaintiff negotiated the return of his deposit.
9.

The Courtfindsthe parties abandoned the Contracts.

10.

Plaintiffs acceptance of the return of his deposit and his subsequent inaction clearly

demonstrate plaintiffs voluntary relinquishment of his known rights particularly with plaintiffs
experience in the auto dealership industry and both parties' uncertainty as to when and if defendant
would receive the contracted vehicles.
11.

Defendant did not breach the parties' Contracts and, as such, plaintiffs Complaint

must be dismissed.
12.

Defendant is awarded its reasonable attorney's fees and costs in an amount to be

proven by Affidavit. Counsel for defendant is instructed to submit a Judgment and Affidavit in
support of reasonable attorney fees and costs consistent with the Court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and Rule 7(f), Utah R. Civ. P.
Dated this ^> day of May, 2009.

TYRONE E. MEDLEY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, to the following, this_^day of May, 2009:

John B. Wilson
John P. Ball
Attorneys for Plaintiff
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Robert W. Hughes
Attorney for Defendant
438 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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DEL DATE
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PURCHASE PRICE AND OTHER SUMS DUE

•

kSH PRICE OF VEHfCLE

Title (If not explain)

N/A
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ODOMETER
STATEMENT

AUTHORIZATION
FOR PAYOFF

PROPERTY
TAX

N/A
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OR REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING SELLERS ABILITY TO OBTAIN FINANCING FOR THE
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TERMS OF THIS CONTRACT ALL THE FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS ARE THE SOLE RESPON
SIBILTY OF THE PURCHASER
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IF SELLER IS NOT ABLE TO ARRANGE FINANCING WITHIN THE TERMS DISCLOSED THEN
SELLER MUST WITHIN SEVEN CALENOAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF SALE MAIL NOTICE TO THE
PURCHASER THAT HE/SHE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO ARRANGE FINANCING PURCHASER THEN
HAS 14 DAYS FROM DATE OF SALE TO E^ECT IF HE/SHE CHOOSES TO RESCIND THE
CONTRACT OF SALE PURSUANT TO SECTION 41 3-401
IN ORDER TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT OF SALE THE PURCHASER SHALL
(1) RETURN TO SELLER THE MOTOR VEHICLE PURCHASED
(2) PAY THE SELLER 30 CENTS FOR EACH MILE THE MOTOR VEHICLE HAS BEEN DRIVEN ANO
(3) COMPENSATE SELLER FOR ANY PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE MOTOR VEHICLE
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vt haser and Co Pu rhas*> (s) f any (hereahe referred to as Purchased) hereby agree to purchase the follow ng vehcie from Seller/Oeiter (hereane referred o as SelleO subject lo
i i n m s condit ons warrani es and agreements conta ned here n lnclud ng those pnnted on the reverse s de hereof
^E / j USED

SERES

MAKE

XX.

LGT40

FORD

SALESPERSON

03/QA/02
P U R C H A S E PRICE AND OTHER SUMS

DUE

•
? ACCESSORIES OPTIONS

3

KERSEY

Title (If not explain)

N/fl
N/fl

1 CASH PRICE OP VEHICLE

V 5TFVT

THIS SECTION FOR SELLER S USE ONLY PERTAINING TO TRADE IN

POWER
OF ATTORNEY

BILL
OF SALE

N/fl

PROPERTY
TAX

ODOMETER
STATEMENT

AUTHORIZATION
FOR PAYOFF

N/fl
TOTAL CASH PRICE (add lines 1 5)
MFR REBATE

N/fl

NOTICE ONLY TO BUYERS OF USED VEHICLES

N/fl

The information y o u see o n the w i n d o w form [Buyer s GuKte| for his vehicle is part of this contract
Information o n the w i n d o w f o r m overrides a n y contrary provis ons in the contract of sale

N/fl

N/fl)
N/fl

I PORTION/REBATE APPLIED TO PURCHASE
SUB TOTAL

(lines 6 minus £

I HAVE RECEIVED A COPY O F T H E F T C U S E D CAR BUYERS GUIDE

FINANCING DISCLOSURE

TRADE IN AND/OR OTHER CREDITS

INSTRUCTION O n e of the two lollowmg disclosures either A or "B must be acknowledged If
Purchaser agrees to be responsible for financing or if this is a cash only or cash plus trade in only
transaction then Purchaser must sign disclosure A " If Seller agrees to arrange for financing then both
Seller and Purchaser must sign disclosure "B" BY SIGNING P U R C H A S E R AFFIRMS THAT HE/SHE
HAS READ T H E D I S C L O S U R E A N D A G R E E S T H E R E T O IF SIGNING D I S C L O S U R E B D O
NOT SIGN UNTIL A L L B L A N K S HAVE B E E N FILLED IN

PURCHASER AGREES TO ARRANGE FINANCING
BALANCE OWED ON TRADE IN
UANCE OWED TO
DDRESS
C

F
ED BY

"(A) THE PURCHASER O F T H E M O T O R VEHICLE DESCRIBED IN THIS C O N T R A C T A C K N O W L
EDGES THAT T H E SELLER O F T H E M O T O R VEHICLE HAS M A D E N O PROMISES W A R R A N T I E S
OR REPRESENTATIONS R E G A R D I N G SELLER S ABILITY T O OBTAIN FINANCING F O R T H E
PURCHASE OF THE M O T O R V E H I C L E F U R T H E R M O R E P U R C H A S E R UNDERSTANDS THAT IF
FINANCING IS NECESSARY IN O R D E R FOR THE PURCHASER TO C O M P L E T E THE PAYMENT
TERMS O F THIS C O N T R A C T ALL THE FINANCING A R R A N G E M E N T S A R E THE SOLE R E S P O N
SIBILTY O F THE P U R C H A S E R
SIGNATURE
OF PURCHASER

N/fl

GOOD
UNTIL

SELLER AGREES TO ARRANGE FINANCING

^ u.OF
ERIFICATION

ACC U

A R R A N T Y A S T O B A L A N C E O W E D O N T R A D E D IN V E H I C L E
rhaser warrants that he/she has g ven Seller a true pay off amount on any
rle raded in and thai f t is -not correct and s greater than the amount shown
\/p Purchaser * II p a / the exceso to S^lle on d«»mand
TRADE IN ALLOWANCE

J±2£L

BALANCE OWFD OH TRADE IN
NET ALLOWANCE ON TRADF IN

M/Q
(line 10 minus 11)

DEpQSi1/CASH OQWN PAYMENT
TOTAL CREDITS

N/fl
.tflflfl. Plfl
Iflflffl flfl)

(omit amt line £
(total linos i2&13)

SUB TOTAL FROM LINE Q

Mm.

SERVICE CONTRACT

-±U£L
SUB TOTAL TAXABLE ITEMS
TRADE ALLOWANCE

(total lines 15 17)

(line 1

N/Q

N/fl

NFF TAXABLE AMOUNT
(line 18 minus line 19)

N/fl

UTAH SALES/USE TAX ON TAXABLE AMOUNT

N/fl
ftfl. 58
-152UML

LICENSE & REGISTRATION FEES
PROPERTY ASSESSMENT FEE(S)
STATE INSPECTION/EMISSIONS TEST

.N/fl

STATE WASTE TIRE RECYCLING FEE

'S.m

FEDERAL LUXURY TAX
DEALER DOCUMENTARY SERVICE FEE

TOTAL OF ALL ITEMS ABOVE

(lines 18 2127)

TOTAL CREDITS

BALANCE DUE
MONTH

(line 14)
(total line 29 minus 30)
YEAR

(

_MZ£L
1BS.Q0
N/fl
3fl9. 50
jgiflfl.ftgi)

(B) M T H E P U R C H A S E R O F T H E M O T O R VEHICLE DESCRIBED I N THIS C O N T R A C T H A S
EXECUTED T H E C O N T R A C T IN R E L I A N C E U P O N T H E SELLER S REPRESENTATION THAT
SELLER C A N PROVIDE FINANCING A R R A N G E M E N T S FOR T H E P U R C H A S E O F T H E M O T O R
VEHICLE T H E PRIMARY T E R M S O F T H E FINANCING ARE * S F O L L O W S
INTEREST RATE B E T W E E N _

-4f/A-

JLUfr

BETWEEN!

_ MONTHS MONTHLY PAYMENTS

N / f l PER MONTH AND $..

ON A DOWN PAYMENT OF $ _

PER MONTH 8ASED

JLa0£L_C0_

IF SELLER IS NOT ABLE TO ARRANGE FINANCINC WITHIN THE TERMS DISCLOSED THEN
SELLER MUST WITHIN SEVEN CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF SALE MA L NOTICE TO THE
PURCHASER THAT HE/SHE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO ARRANGE FINANCING PURCHASER THEN
HAS 14 DAYS FROM DATE OF SALE TO ELECT IF HE/SHE CHOOSES TO RESCIND THE
CONTRACT OF SALE PURSUANT TO SECTION 41 3 401
IN ORDER TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT OF SALE THE PURCHASER SHALL
(1) RETURN TO SELLER T H E M O T O R VEHICLE PURCHASED
(2) PAY THE SELLER 3 0 C E N T S FOR EACH MILE THE MOTOR VEHICLE HAS BEEN D R I V E N A N D
(3) COMPENSATE SELLER FOR A N Y PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO T H E MOTOR VEHICLE
IN RETURN SELLER SHALL G I V E BACK T O T H E PURCHASER ALL PAYMENTS O R O T H E R
CONSIDERATION PAID B Y T H E P U R C H A S E R INCLUDING ANY D O W N PAYMENT A N D ANY
MOTOR VEHICLE T R A D E D IN IF T H E T R A D E IN HAS BEEN SOLD OR OTHERWISE DISPOSED O F
BEFORE T H E PURCHASER RESCINDS T H E TRANSACTION THEN T H E SELLER SHALL R E T U R N
TO T H E PURCHASER A S U M EQUIVALENT T O THE ALLOWANCE T O W A R D T H E PURCHASE
PRICE GIVEN BY THE SELLER FOR THE TRADE IN AS N O T E D IN T H E D O C U M E N T OF SALE
SIGNING THIS DISCLOSURE D O E S NOT PROHIBIT THE PURCHASER FROM SEEKING HIS O W N
FINANCING
SIGNATURE
OF PURCHASER
SIGNATURE
OF SELLER

OTHER TERMS AGREED TO

NONE •

2_ ^

AS FOLLOWS D

Qrr u o

^Xt

^610,50

iser has arranged insurance on vehicle through _

_°, PER ANNUM TERMBFrWEEN

AND _

_ MONTHS AND .

AT

_ insurance company Policy t _

stated on the reverse side of this document unless Seller has gwen to Purchaser an Express Warranty tn writing Seller makes no Warranty express o( implied with respect to the merchantability
for particular purpose or otherwise concerning the vehicle parts or accessories described herein Unless otherwise indicated m wnttng any warranty is Imited lo *hal provided by the
if any as explained and conditioned by Paragraph 4 on the reverse side hereof
yees that this contract includes all of the terms conditions and warranties on both the lace and reverse side hereof that this agreement cancels and supersedes any prior aqreement and as of
te hereof comprises the complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement relatng to the subject matters covered hereby PURCHASER BY HIS/HER EXECUTION OF THIS
MENT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT HE/SHE HAS READ ITS TERMS CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES BOTH ON THE FACE AND THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF AND HAS RECEIVED A TRUE
OF THIS AGREEMENT ANDlFtJftTMEB AGREES TO PAY THE BALANCE DUE" SET FORTH ABOVE ON OR BEFORE THE DATE SPECIFIED
JRE
;HASER.

OATE

( 3 3 / 0 4 / 0 2 VEHICLE TO BE
TTTLEDWNAMEOF_

'31/flfr/fl°

Mar--05-02

05:13P

Henr-y

SELLER/DEALER.
D€OL *:

Day

Ford

Fleet

801

975

P . 02

2619

MOTOR VEHICLE CONTRACT OF SALE

03/34/(32
DATE OF SALE

1961

•HJflJfflTftifctS,.

HENRY DPY FORD INC
3B9S S REDWOOD ROAD
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 8 4 H 9

2337 EAST 62*3 SOUTH
SALT LAHE CITY SALT LAKE UT 84121
CI TV

(Wl>878-19i3
p«*th»5««' »nO Co-Purcru3«ffs|. if aity. (h«f««rt«f f r * » « * d ic * i 'Pu»< hAN<y) "•'^<»y - v y * *
«l ivmt.

!-f/r>-:il«T

»o pu'cn»-M i n * .'r>iio««.wj vHw-ir i

(»»'ir.i/l«M

•O. .,.!.,,-,

co<»a»tioni, w«fr*r*y»« «nd » g r « « m « n U coni»»n«0 l"N«»«tn, lnauem<j ino#« o m ' U d on tfvo f«v««»« «W« n««to«.

u«o

semes

OEMO YEA*

FORD

XX

GT 4 «

GT 4 3

SAltb^tHbO*

• «/8*/fi2
Q

\ CASH PRICf OF VEHICLE

I

Trtto (if not, »xpl»in):

N/R

N/fl

2 ACCESSORIES/OPTIONS

Ml

N/fl
6. TOTAL CASH PRICE (acid lines 1 -5)

jiza

N/q

8 PORTION/REBATE APPLIED TO PURCHASE
(lin& & minus 8)
9 SUBTOTAL

N/flJ

fct/.a.

TRADE-IN AND/OR OTHER CREDITS

^urnwmnoM

JTAfCMCKT

Of iTTCWHCr

Of 1 « U

N/Q

7 MfR. REBATE

V 5TFVF KFBSEL

THIS SECTION FOR SELLER'S USE ONLY PERTAINING TO TRAOE-IN

P U R C H A S E PRICE ANO OTHER S U M S DUE

POR PAYOFF

NOTICE ONLY TO BUYERS OF USED VEHICLES
The in*omwi«on you jef on lot window lorm {8uycr's GUKJC| /or ihis vehicle ts pan of ihio contract
Information on Ihc window lorm overrides any contrary provisions ID (he contrwci of snu*.
\ HAVE WLCCWSO A COPY OP THE PTC uSfeU C-AH RUY VMS liUtOfc.
X

FINANCING DISCLOSURE
INSTRUCTION. Ono of UtO Iwo loikr^KKj <AwJ«iiufvs, »»itrw»f "A" nr *8". musl be acknowl«lgcrJ. II
Pwcta**i 4tyv** (u b»» f«sponM(»i<; ktt fVwiong. or i< this is 3 cash-onry or cash-piufc.itacl«-«» wily
h-mi.<wction. Hi».n Pii^n^Mr nn«t sign d*sdosurc 'A*. K Sdter ao/o« to a/raj'ige h> hn-wc**}. Ih-^i hrviS e ^ ' VKJ Puctnuer musi sion disclosure TT. OY SIGNING. PUHCHASER APFIRMSTHAT HE/SHE
HAS READ THE DISCLOSURE ANO AGHfcES TTH6R6TO. If SIGNING PiSCLOSURE "8", DO
NOT SfGN UNTIL ALL BLANKS HAVC SEEN FILLED W.

PURCHASER AGREES TO ARRANGE FINANCING
'8ALANCE OWED ON TRADE-IN:

"(A)" THE PUROlAStH OV THe MOTClfl VFHir.LE DESCRIBED IN THIS CONTRACT ACKNOwikOG€S THAT THg s e u Efl Of THE MOTOR VEHKSLL* HAS MADE NO PROMISES. WARRANT!??
OR R6PR£S€KTAT10N5 nEGARWNG SCLLERS A8lUTy lO OtiTAiN FINANCJNG FOR THE
PUPCHASE OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE. FURTH6HM0«£, ^UHCMA^Ep UNOERSTANOS THAT IF
F1NANONG IS N€C£S3A«Y IN OHOER FQR THE PURCHASEn TO COMPLCTt Tl \£ PAYMtM
T£RMS OW I H i i CU^IRACT AH. TH£ F^NANCMG ARRANGCW£MTS ARC. m e sexg ReypoNSI8ILTY OF THE PURCHASER

N/fl

BALANCE OWED TO:
A00RE5S.

or pupawsefc

ACC. *

WARRANTY AS TO BALANCE OWED ON TRAOED-lN VEHICLE:

|Mufv-n;iy«;r r/.inU'iU» lluil I lutein: Uau y*v*in Sollvr 4 i r u * pay-o/l a m o u n l nn a n y
rr*rt*d m. .-»nd ihni rf it e« not c t v i p ^ ;»vt is QfcatCi WHIM U « J «UIWVJ»I< J » U W * I
j O o v y , Purct'UJuvr v»ill p a y <fi« wxcuss to 3*»i\«r o n d « m * n d ,

10. TRADE-IN ALLOWANCE
i I BALANCE OWEO ON TRAOE-IN"'"

-4UA-M/fl

12. NET ALLOWANCE ON TRADE-IN

(Hue U) rmrwis 11)

13. OEf'OSiTOSH DOWN J'AYMtrJT
14. KKALCHEUliS

N/a

(nmrt .wrrt. hnr. a)
(trial Imcr. 17 & 13)

15. SUB-TOTAL FROM LINE 9
Ifi, SfRVlCF CONTRACT
17.
18. SU8 TOTAL-TAXABLE ITEMS
19. TRADE ALLOWANCE

(total laws 1 M / )

(Site 10) ;

jgtag.^i
-*/flJkUA.
-M/ft.
-*UA-

HJQ

20 NET TAXABLE AMOUNT
(line 18 annusfam19)

-AU&

21. UTAH SALES/USE (AX ON -JAXABLt AMU IN T

.

.MISL.

22. LICENSED REGISTRATION FEES
a . PROPERTY ASSESSMENT FEE(S)

;59,»g

2d. STATE INSPECTIOf^EMISSIONS TEST
25. STATE WASTE TIRE RECYCLINC FEE
25. FEDERAL LUXURY TAX
27. DEALER DOCUMENTARY SERVICE rt£
28.
29. TOTAL OF ALL ITEMS ABOVE
30. TOTAL CREDITS
31. B A L A N C E D U E
OAY
MONTH

.

SELLER AGREES TO ARRANGE FINANCING

DATE O F
VERIFICATION
A

dGNATliSC

GOOD
UNTIL:

PAYOFF
VERIFIED 8 Y :

(lines 18,21-27)
(line 14)

• 5,83
-W^ftigfe,8Q
-*/A-3Wr«.
lft»9.-$3

(Tola! line 29 minus 30)
YEAR

-(B)" H<t KIHCHAicR OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE DESCRIBED IN THIS CONIHACT HAS
EXECUTED TIC CONTHACt I N HtLWNCE UPON THE SELLER-S RJEPRCSCNTATJON IHAI
SELLER CAW PROVIOC TINANCING AHHAN<;FMFNT.S FOR THE PURCHASE Of THE MOIOH
VEHICLE. THE PRIMARY TERMS Of T) )E KINANUN(» ARE AS FOI i.OWS.
INTERCST RAfk bhIWtbN
j^yq
OETWHENo

UU&

Mn

** TER/WNUM. TCPM UklWfetN

MONT) IS ANO

MONTHS. MONTHLY PAYMENTS

. . . 3 J X Q PER MONTH AA/rj 5

ON A OOWN PAYWFNT OF J . _

PtH MONfH 6A-ScD

l^Q.^Q

IF S P ' ER IS NOT ABIE TO ARRANGL J INANUNG WITHIN THE TERMS niSClOSEO. THEN
SELLER MUST. V/1TI UN X'/EN CALbNUAH OAY? OF THF nATE OF 5ALE MAJL NOTICE TO Tl IC
PURCl IASCR IHAI I It/SHfc HA.'-'. NOT BFPN ARl r TO Af^RANGE rWANCWG. PUHCl lASfcH THEN
HAS 14 UAYS FROM DATE Of SALE TO aECT. IF HCWC CHOO'Jbi. »U HES'OINO THF
CONTRACT Of SALE, PURSUANT TO SECTION 41-3-W1
IN OR0ER TO RESQNO THE CONTRACT OF SALE, TH£ PURCHASER SHALL
(1) RETURN TO SELLER THE MOIOH VfcWCLc RJHCHAS'tD:
(L») PAY Tl/E SLLUH 30 CENTiJ FOR EACH MILE TH€ MOTOR VEHICLE HAS BEEN DRIVDN ANO
Pf CCWHW^ATE SELLHH F(}fl ANY PHYSK>L DAMAGE TO THE MOTOR VQHCLL
IN RFnjrifH. SELLER SHALL GIVC 0AO TO IHfc. PUHCHAS6R ALL PAYMENTS OR OTHER
CONSIDERATION PAJO 0Y Tilt KjHCHASSH. IPKIIIDING ANY DOWN PAYMENT ANO ANY
MOTOR Vfc'l llCU IKA06D IN. IF THE TRAOF-lN HAS BEEN SOLO OR OTIICRWISE DlSPOSbU OF
BEFORE THE PURCHASER RF5CINnS THE TRANSACTION. THEN THE SklLHH SHALL R6711RN
TO THE PURCHASER A SUM EQUIVALENT TO THE ALLOWANO: rOWARO THE PURCHASE
TRICE GIVEN 8Y THE SCLLCR TOR Tl Ik* I HAUk-IN. AS NOTED IN THE OOCUMENT OF SALE.
SIGNING THIS DlSCLOSUHb DOtS NO r PROHIBIT THE PURCHASER FROM SEEKING MS OWN
riNANCtt^G.
SKyHATlJW:
Of pWflCMAvB-K

.„ ..

StONAlVNt

of stLten

.

OTHER TERMS AGREED TO:

o e p - ^ e ^ B<^ tented

NON€ Q

Db^

A5 FOLLOWS D

V^>^o

inwr»noa company. Pt*cy i _
y^chasw ros arranged 'm*u«nc» on v«nici« through
As J staled on ihc nyvse skfc d *w doctimcnL unless Seflcr has grven to Pvichasa an Express Warronty h writing. Scfcr mak«s no WarrarUy. w*& or «wM, w<n iwspwl k> ifw nwchafti^hiry.
fitness lor parttcutor purpose, or oihcrwisc concerning Ihc vehicle, pans a accessories described hcrcia Unless oth«r*tf« mcfica(*»d in m*»iq, w warranty ^ KmAwi io thai p»ovid«?d by irw
n w n u l a d i w f , H wny, 4« «ixpiaifwd J*¥J COndHiODOd 0y ParaOflph 4 on «v» r»v«CM « » f | W 9 0 L

Purttujw .Kfw; tt»i tlw cortrjd mckjdofc 4« o< lh« uxiis. coixWions and mmntos on oo<h the loco and reverse sido tart, that mis agrwowii ca/wnts d»x3 supwwd»« ai>r pnor aqc««Kn«i< and -a ul
the d«te herH)< corppfCMn lh« nompUf. «nri «xriiiwv« ^l«nwil d lh* l,nns d lh* wgf««ri>«nl ;*«li<>g 10 th% cubj^d UwlU»r« umred hwrijuy. PUROHAiiER 3Y HRW£R EXECUTION OF THIS
AGREEMENT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT^3RE HAS READ ITS TERMS. CCWriONS ANO WARRANTIES BOTH ON THE FACE ANO THE REVERSE S»OE HEREOF KfiO HAS RECEIVED A THUE
COPY OF THIS A^EUENTlA«rtfSJHER AGREES TO PAY THE *BALA*CE DUE" SET FOHTH ABOVfe ON OR 8EFOHE THE DATE S^ClFlEU.

i a r - KJ^J -\J<.

\JZ> . J L O ^ n e n r - _ y

SELLER/DEALER
DEAL #x

u a y rora

J- l e Q t

801

975

P - 03

2619

MOTOR VEHICLE CONTRACT OF SALE

03/04/02
DATE 01= SALE

1362

TDM WflTKINS
PtjRriustR <; NAME

HENRY DAY FORD INC
3899 S REDWOOD RORD
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84119

2537 EAST 6200 SOUTH
~

"»TRC6TAO0RCS5

SRLT LftKE CITY SALT LAKE UT 84121
CITY

C8CU27B-1913
I urcnwsr »nd Co Purcbtj«r<5) il any (b#»v*ft«r f*f»fr«d lo a s " P u ' O v - « r ) IK rH/y *«jri«< in »>««« r u v t ih« lfi«o*<ng vehld* trom 3«ner/i)e«)«r ln*r«erter ret«»rtd lo a t S^lltr")
•II t«rm» conditions, w»f^n(<u^ v » ' t y n w H w H ^ i cindwn**! IWf«iM mcluOmg thos« prtntAO on frie raveftA »I<J« h«r«ot

subitct u>

ostoloewojveAfl
XX

6T40

FORD

^Aif^PCRfON

M/gyre

V STEVE HFfffif Y..

THIS SECTION FOR SELLER'S USE ONLY PERTAINING TO TRADE IN

PURCHASE PRICE AND OTHER SUMS DUE

Q TiUc (if not, explain)
1 CASH PRICE OF VEHICLE
2 ACCESSORIES/OPTIONS

N/fl

3

N/fl 1

N/fl
POWER
OfATTOWEY

BUL
OFSAU

PROPERTY
TAX

OWMHER
SUHUEHT

AUTHORIZATION
POR PAYOFF

N/fl
NOTICE ONLY TO BUYERS OF USED VEHICLES
6 TOTAL CASH PRICE (jdci lines 1 5)

N/fl

7 ~MFR REBATE $
liZflL
8 PORTION/REBATE APPLIED TO PURCHASE
(lines 6 annus 8)
9 SUBTOTAL

N/ft*.

Tho information you sec on ihc window form (Buyer s Guidej for this vehicle is pan; oi ifoi tonifdti
InfouiwttKin on it M» window lorm overrides any contrary piovtsions m ihc contract ot sole
I HAVE RECEIVED A COPY OF THE FTC USFL) CAH BUYERS GUIOE

jiza
FINANCING DISCLOSURE

TRADE-IN AND/OR OTHER CREDITS

INSTRUCTION One of &W h*o tallowing o»scbisnre^ *rt»ie» *A" <W H' musl be 3<-knowiedq«d If
Purchase sgrwstobe responsible lor financing orrfthis » a cash onty or c«*.h plus trade-in onl>
tiim&itdoi itwn Purchaseroust&qn o*dosure "A* II Sellor agrees to arrange (or fmartong then both
5e«er and Purchaser must s»gn d»^ctovife TT" RY SIGNING PURCHASER A F R R M ^ THAT Hg/?He
HAS REAO THE DISCLOSURE ANO AGREES THERETO IF SIGNING DISCLOSURE " 8 ' DO
NOT SIGN UNTIL A U BLANKS HAVE BEEN FILLfcO IN

PURCHASER AGREES TO ARRANGE FINANCING
'BALANCE OWED ON TRADE-IN
BALANCE OWED TO
ADDRESS

"(A)' THE PURCHASER OF THE MOTQP VEHICLE DESCRIBED IN THIS CONTHACI ACKNQwi
EDGES THAT Tl IE SELLER Or THC MOTOR VEHICLE HAS MADE NO PROMISES WARRANTIES
OR REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING SfcLLfcH'S ABILITY fO OBIAlN FINANCING POH IHfc
PURCHASE OF THE MQTQR VEH«C1£ FURTHERMORE PURCHASER UNDERSTANDS THAT IF
FINANCING IS NECESSARY IN OROER FOR THE PURCHASER TO COMPLETE THE PAYMENT
TERMS OF WIS CONTRACT A U THE FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS ARE THE SOLfc WEAPON
SWILTY OF THE PURCHASER

N/fi

PAYOFF
VERIFIED BY

GOOD
UNTIL

DATE OF
VERIFICATION

ACC *

SELLER AGREES TO ARRANGE FINANCING

WARRANTY AS TO BALANCE OWED ON TRAD60-IN VEHICLE
j P u r c f w ^ f w«rr«n<« Thai h e / s h e h a s g v « n Selle r 4 tru« p a y oft a m o u n t o n a n y
vehicle l i u d u i * i dini I M I< it » iiol u u r r u t a n d & yu.c»fcf U M I I 8 K , »<nwutil stuvwi
s h w f P u r r h a v M - wtH p»iy ih*» w r c m 10 S>ll*r on d e m a n d

10 TRAQf- WAILOWANCt

•4UA-

11 BALANCE OWED ON TRADE-IN*
12 NET ALLOWANCE ON TRAQE IN
U QEIOSIT/CASH DOWN PAYMENT
14

(fcne 10 mmus 11)
(omrt a m i lim 8)
ttntm

I0TAI CHCOllS

15 SUB-TOTAL FROM LINE 9
1b SERVICE CONTRACT
17
18 ^1B T()TAL-TAXABLkJ2fcMS

\mn 12 & 11)

(Urt.il lin«sJ5J/)

19 TRADE AUOWANLT ftmr 10) |

""

20 NET TAXABLE AM0UN1
(line 18 minus line 19) fc
21 UTAH SALES-USE TAX ON TAXABLE AMOUNT

M /

~

w/a

22 LICENSE &REGIS1RATI0N FEES
23 PROPERTY ASSESSMENT FEE(S1
94 STATE INSPECTION/EMISSIONS TEST
25 STATE WASTE TIRE RECYCLING f&
26 FEDERAL LUXURY TAX
27 DEALER DOCUMENTARY SERVICE FCC

28
(lines 18. ?1-?7)J
(hnc U)

29 TOTAL OF ALL ITEMS ABOVE
30 TOTAL CREDITS

31 BALANCE DUE
DAY

MONTH

(total line 29 minus 30}
.YEAR

-*UA100Q,00
UMffl.Bg'
-H/AN/fl
-N/#-

-**7A41,53
159,99
-N/A5.93
-N7A4^&^
-N/fl389,50
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" ( B r THE PURCHASER OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE 0E5CRIBED IN THIS CONTRACT HAS
EXFCUTED THF CONTRACT IN RELIANCE UTON THE SELLER'S REPRESENTATION 'HAT
SELLER CAN PROVIDE FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PURCHASE OF THC MOTOR
VEHICJ E THF PRIMARY TERMS OF THE FINANCING ARE AS FOLLOWS
INTEREST RATE 0ETWCCN
N /flf>A N D
MONTHS ANO
BETWEEN $ _ _
N / Q PER MONTH AND % m

PER MONTH BASED

ON A DOWN PAYMENT OF %
Ifrgg, gg
IF SELLER IS NOT AOLC TO ARRANGE FINANCING Win UN TllE lEHMo UlSUOsbO I HEN
SELLER MUST Wi fHiN SfcVfcN CALFN()AR DAYS OF THE DATE Of SALE MAIL NOTICE TO THE
PURCHASER THAT HE-SHE HAS NOTSEEN ABLE TO ARRANGG WANCING. PURCI iAoth • IILN
HAS 14 OAYS FROM DATE O f SALE TO ELECT IF HE/SHE CHOOSES TO RLSCWU IHfc
CONTRACT OF SALE PURSUANT TO SECTION 4; 3^401
IN ORDER TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT QF SALE THE PURCHASER SHALI
(1) RETURN TO SELLER THE MOTOR VEHICLE PURCHASED
(2) PAY THE SELLER 30 CENTS TOR CACH M8X THC MOTOR VEHICLE HAS 6LLN UHlVbN ANU
(3) COMPfeNSAlb SfcLLER K)H ANY PHYSICAL UAMAGfc fO • Hk MO I OP VEHICLE
IN RETURN, SELLER SHALL GIVE BACK TO THE PURCHASER ALL PAYMENTS OR OTHEn
CONSIDERATION PAID BY THC PURCHASER INCLUDING ANY DOWN PAYMENT AND ANY
MOTOR VB11CLE TRADED IN IF I Hk J KAOk-tN HAS WkkN SOLD OH OI HfcHWtSE OT-.HOSED OF
BEFORE THE P1JRCHA5.ER RESCINDS THE TRANSACTION THFN THF SEl LER SHALL RETURN
TO THE PURCHASER A SUM EQUIVALENT TO THE ALLOWANCE TOWARD THE PURCHASE
PRICE GIVEN BY THE SELLER FOR THF TRADE-IN AS NOTFD IN THF DOCUMENT OF SALE
SIGNING THIS DJSCLOSURF DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE PURCHASER FROM SEEKING HIS OWN
FINANCING

<tfbeUJEH_

OTHER TERMS AGREED TO:
VSftzSzrr

^ ^

NONED

AS FOLLOWS D

GTHO
O A ^ F^£J:>

-G1E*53

Purchasor has arranged insurance on vehicle through _

% PEP ANNUM TFRM BETWEEN
MONTHS MONTHLY PAYMFNTS

^ u»Ufano» company P c f c y t

^fc.t tO-

As is staled on ^e reverse side of lb* document, ur«l«$s S«K«r t\*£ gw«n to Purchase an Express Warranty n writing Scficr nt3l<C5 no Warranty express or impked vwth f«pect lo the mwrJvntohilits
Wncsc lor particular purpose, or othenwrf pnfv»niing lh* vehicle parts or aoc««oii»« d«icrft»d her«m Uritess othorwtso indicated n wnang any warranty a Homed to ihnl provided by the
manulaaurf rrf»ny «s «»pli«n#d *nd rondiilontd by Pwsgnph 4 on th« ™««r»e «d« bannd
Purchaser agrees that thrs conmtf *&&* *H vl UW torn* twidlioitt and warranties on both the lace and reverse side hereof, thai ihrs 9typm\rt\\ Mnorfs and vjpwitdBS any pnw ^ntmn^ «id a* ol
trw date hereof compnses the complete «nd exclusive ^temont d the terms of the ao/oemonf rdating to the subject mattera rovered r*n»by PURCHASER BY HISVHER EXECUTION OF THIS
AGREEMENT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT HFJBHE HAS READ ITS TERMS, CONOmONS ANO WARRANTIES BOTH ON THE FACE ANO THF REVERSE 'TOE HEREOF AND HAS RECEIVED A IHUfc
COPY OF THIS AGREEMENT A N P P P j ^ AGREES TO PAY THE "BALANCE DUE* SET FORTH ABOVE ON OR BEFORE THE DATE SPEC1FIFR

*GNATU« ^ ^ < r ^ T ) # K
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A.

They have them in several places across the country.

Their first one of the year is Las Vegas. The second one is in
Scottsdale, Arizona. And then the third one is in Palm
Springs, Florida.
Q.

And you attend some or all of them?

A.

I don't go to Florida, but I go to the others.

Q.

And how long has that — has that been your practice

to attend those Barrett-Jackson auto auctions?
A.

For years.

Q.

Are those open to the public?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you use automobile auctions in your own dealership

to buy and sell automobiles?
A.

Yes, we do.

Q.

And do you collect automobiles yourselves?

A.

I have at any one time anywhere from two to four

automobiles. Right now I have three.
Q.

These are I presume somewhat unusual automobiles?

A.

Yes. Yes.

Q.

Well, let's turn our attention then to the

transaction that is the siibject of this lawsuit. And it
revolves as we've heard around your attempt to purchase two
automobiles from the defendant. Describe the automobile and
how you came to be interested in trying to purchase it.
A.

In 1966 Ford came out with a race car called the Ford
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GT40.

And it was fabulously successful for the next five

years.

It was the first time that an American car with

American drivers were able to consistently beat the Europeans
on their home tracks. For in the car community, it was a proud
moment for us.
The car was beautiful.

The car was iconic.

The car

was widely acclaimed and famous.
In December of 2002 to celebrate their anniversary,
Ford unveiled at the Detroit Auto Show a replica, an updated
version of this car and called it the Ford GT40.

It was

unveiled in Detroit to wild applause in the car community,
became instantly famous. The acclaim for it was so great, the
next month, Bill Ford of Ford Motor Company, announced they
would build this car in limited numbers. The numbers fainted
about were something on the order of 3000 cars is all that
would be built.
Q.

Did, did the information you reviewed on Ford's plans

indicate when these cars would be built?
MR. HUGHES: Your Honor, I'm going to object on the
grounds of hearsay.

I've been waiting, and I think the last

few questions — but we're clearly in the hearsay area.
THE COURT:
MR. WILSON:

You wish to respond?
I'm asking the witness's understanding

of the history of this automobile, and it goes not to the truth
of the matter but to explain how it was he became interested
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Q.

What did you understand was Day's obligation if it

didn't receive any cars?
A.

He had no obligation to me then.

Q.

Between that time and the end of December, 2002,

first of January, 2002, did you have any communication at all
with Henry Day Ford?
A.

Not — not until I received the letter.

Q.

Describe that.

A.

We received a letter at my house. It had the check

in there and the letter said that they were returning my
deposit because they were not going to receive the cars.
Q.

The letter you refer to and the enclosed check is

admitted in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 4. Is that right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And the letter says in part, "We regret to inform you

that our allocation is not going to allow us to receive this
vehicle." Is this the first you had heard that from Henry Day
Ford?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Were you surprised to get this letter?

A.

Disappointed, but not surprised because from the

outset we knew that there was the possibility that they
wouldn't get the cars.
Q.

What did you do with the check?

A.

Deposited it.
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1

MR. HUGHES: And those were the ones that came out of

2

the file of the court exactly, but just to make sure we're all

3

on the same page.

4

THE COURT: Go ahead.

5
6

Q.

(BY MR. HUGHES) At any rate, sir, you on the motor

vehicle contracts were asking what kind of series car?

7

A.

A Ford GT40.

8

Q.

And the bodty type was what?

9 J

A.

Here Mr. Kersey has put in GT40.

10

Q.

Well, you signed this contract, did you not, sir?

11

A.

I did.

12

Q.

So you agreed with that, did you not?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

In fact, if you would for me — well, I'll do it, the

15 very bottom of the contract it says, "Purchaser agrees that
16

this contract includes all the terms, conditions and warrantees

17

on both face and reverse side hereof. And that this agreement

18

cancels and supersedes any prior agreements. And as of the

19

date hereof ccomprises complete and exclusive statement of the

20

terms of the agreement related to the subject matters covered

21 hereby."
22

So you read that, did you not?

23

A.

No, I didn't but —

24

Q.

Well, let me ask it this way. How long have you been

25

filling out these contracts, sir?

1

A.

Many years.

2

Q.

And you knew that was there, did you not?

3

A.

Yes, sir.

4

Q.

You didn't have to read it specifically this time,

5

correct?

6

A.

Correct.

7

Q.

And you knew that this contract reflected your deal

8

with Henry S. Day? And then if we look at it, and you actually

9

called, you've testified, Mr. Kersey and said, "Well, you

10

forgot to put in purchase for MSRP." Mr. Kersey made that

11

change, correct?

12

A.

Correct.

13

Q

And that's Exhibit 2?

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

And was Mr. Kersey pretty accommodating in that?

16

A

Very. Yes, sir.

17

Q

And was there ever a period, sir, you called and

18 J said, "I don't want to buy a Ford GT40. I want to buy a Ford
19

GT." The contract should again be changed"?

20

A.

No.

21

Q.

If we look through this contract, sir, you were going

22

to actually pay more for this vehicle than the MSRP. Isn't

23

that correct?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

In fact, you were allotted — these are left blank

1

Q.

Did you sign that deposition, sir?

2

A.

I'm sure I did.

3

Q.

Did you indicate when you signed that, that that was

4

a mistake, that you misspoke?

5

A.

No.

6

Q.

But that was your testimony, sir, that you had seen a

7

Ford GT40?

8

A.

Correct.

9

Q.

Isn't it a fact, sir, that Ford often takes a car

10

into market and markets it and then brings the car back for

11

sale with a same name?

12

A.

Not often, no.

13

Q.

But they do do that, do they not, sir?

14

A.

They did in this case.

15

Q.

Have they done it, for instance, with the Ford Shelby

16
17

car, the Shelby Mustang?
A.

No, not exactly.

The early Shelby's were called

18 ! Shelby 350. For example, they did not reintroduce it as the
19

Shelby 350.

20

Q.

But they did reintroduce a Mustang again as a Shelby?

21

A.

Yes, they did.

22

Q.

Isn't it possible, sir, that Ford could also in the

23

They reintroduced it as the Shelby.

But —

future manufacture, produce a Ford GT40?

24

A.

I guess anything is possible.

25

Q.

In fact, that wouldn't be inconsistent with some of

1

Exhibits 1 and 2, line — paragraph 2, if you fail to buy the

2

car, Henry Day Ford had the right to keep that money, did they

3

not?

4

A.

Well, I don't know.

5

Q.

And if I can, I'll read that to you, sir. Mine was

6

upside down. I was being lazy.

7

"If the purchaser does not pay the balance due by the

8 I date indicated on the reverse side of this agreement, then the
9
10

seller may set off its damages for any cash deposit or down
payment received from the purchaser." Correct?

11 I

A.

Correct.

12

Q.

So you as an auto dealer if you are buying, going out

13

to look for and obtain a car that you don't want to have, you

14 J want to make sure a person is ready, willing and able to buy
15

it?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

And if not you would at least have some recourse to

18

recoup some money?

19

A.

Yes, against our damages. Yes.

20

Q.

I'm going — you and Mr. Kersey agreed to the

21

thousand dollars?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

And the thousand dollars was part of the contract?

24
25

Correct?
A.

Correct.

Q.

And, in fact, the thousand dollars was the

consideration for the contract, was it not?
MR. WILSON:

I'll object to that to the extent it

calls for a legal conclusion.
THE COURT:

Sustained.

MR. HUGHES:
THE COURT:

Well, your Honor —
Go ahead.

MR. HUGHES:
admission, if I may.

—

this is part of a request for

That question was asked specifically to

the plaintiff and he has answered that question.
THE COURT:

Do you wish to respond?

MR. WILSON:
THE COURT:

Same objection, your Honor.
Yeah, I think it's a proper objection.

MR. HUGHES:
Q.

Thank you, your Honor.

(BY MR. HUGHES)

Do you have any reason to believe,

sir, that they would not have written this contract, Mr. Kersey
would not have written this contract if you had not deposited
the thousand dollars?
A.

I don't think he would have written it with —

I

think they would have required a deposit.
Q.

Well, that deposit was important, was it not, sir?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You already testified that you received the deposit

back, correct?
A,

Correct.
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Q.

And that was in December of 2002, approximately

eight, nine months after Henry Day held it? Whatever it is.
Correct?
A.

Correct.

Q.

Did you call Henry Day and say, "Keep my check"?

A.

No.

Q.

Did you call to object to them returning it to

them — to you?
A.

No.

Q.

In fact, your testimony was you were just

disappointed, weren't you?
A.

Correct.

Q.

In fact, you testified earlier, sir, that you thought

they might be holding your money for many years?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And why did you accept your contract and deposit back

after just eight or nine months?
A.

Because it was accompanied by a letter saying they

were not going to get the cars, and that was a possibility from
the outset.
Q.

You filed a complaint in this matter, did you not,

A.

Yes.

Q.

And have you read that complaint with your attorneys?

A.

Yes.

sir?
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Q.

I reference you to paragraph 20. And I'll just read

it for you.

"Because Ford had not yet begun producing the Ford

GT, Watkins did not expect to receive delivery of the Ford GTs
for many months. "
Was it many months or many years, sir?
A.

We didn't know for sure. We knew it would be many

months and it could extend to years.
Q.

But your complaint says actually many months. Would

that be accurate?
A.

Yes.

Q.

You talk about when you went back into Henry Day.

You met with a person you don't know the name of.
THE COURT: You have to give an audible answer so
it's recordable as opposed to nodding your head.
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. I didn't hear a question.
THE COURT: Well, then tell him you didn't —
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. I didn't hear a question.
Q.

(BY MR. HUGHES) Do you recall your testimony, sir —

thank you —
A.

Yes.

Q.

— when you went back to Henry Day and you met with

someone you don't know the name of?
A.

Yes.

Q.

How do you know — why do you think he was a sales

manager?
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1
2

You certain you went to Henry S. Day for the first
time on March 4th, 2002?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

How are you so sure of that, sir?

5

A.

I only went there one day, and it was the day I wrote

6

the check and the day that we signed the contracts and the date

7

on the check and the date on the contracts are on that day,

8

plus it's my recollection.

9

Q.

At any rate, the contracts that you've just signed,

10

and let's look at tab 2 that have MSRP, they were never

11

modified to say Ford GT, were they, sir?

12

A.

No.

13

Q.

If somebody came into one of your lots and came to

14

your office manager and said and demanded a car that they said

15

they had a contract for but they were demanding a car that was

16

not represented on the contract, would you have sold it to

17

them?

18
19
20
21

A.

If I had been on the other side of this agreement, I

would have. Yes, I would have sold them the car.
Q.

Would your — would your sales manager have had the

authority to do that, sir?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Did Mr. Kersey tell you specifically that they were

24

going to be allotted the car during this March 4th meeting

25

because they were going to win the President' s award?

A.

He didn't tell me they were specifically going to be

allotted a car.

It was —

there was a question as to whether

they were going to be allotted a car at all. But we were aware
and did discuss, and I did discuss and the other dealers were
aware of the President's Award.
Q.

But you never discussed that with Mr. Kersey, did

you, sir?
A.

We did talk about the President's Award.

Q.

Tell me what you recall about that conversation, sir?

A.

Just that there was a President's Award.

And they

have anticipated it was going to play into this somehow, and
they thought they were going to get the cars.

They expected to

get the car.
Q.

Do you know when Ford decided to allow for a

percipient, for example, of the President's Award that they
would be allotted a Ford GT model vehicle?
A.

We have copies of the letter from Ford to Henry Day.

So if that's what you are talking about, yes, I have seen those
letters and I am aware of that date. But I was not aware of
that the day I went in and spoke with Mir. Kersey.
Q.

Have you look, sir, at you just mentioned trial

exhibit, well, trial exhibits. Would you look at trial Exhibit
No. 7, sir?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Is this one of the letters you were just referring
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A.

Let's see.

Yes.

Q.

Will you look at the background, sir?

A. Yes.
Q.

It says, "In December we announced the allocation

plan for a Ford GT production." Do you see that?
A.

Allocation.

Q.

Allocation?

A. Yes.
Q.

So they didn't even announce that and according to

this letter until December, correct?
A. Yes.
Q.

And so at the time you met in March of 2002, we're

about two years in front of this letter, are we not, sir?
A. Yes.
Q.

And it says, it continues, "As you recall there were

three primary ways to earn allotment: The 2003 Share of the
Nation, and retail car and truck sales, the 2003 President's
Award winners and Lottery."
So you wouldn't even know — you wouldn't even know
if they were awarded one of the President's Award of the
National Retail Car and Sales Truck Share Award until after the
2003 year, would they, sir?
A.

I don't know. All I know is as I was calling dealers

from Ogden down to Provo, they made me aware of a President's
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Award and that in some way that figured into the allocations.
That's —
Q.

And when did that happen, sir? When did they tell

you that?
A.

In March of f02.

Q.

How is it possible for them to have known that, sir,

if you know?
A.

I don't know.

Q.

And let's go down to purpose while we're on this

document.
A.

Okay.

Q.

"We're pleased to inform you that your dealership has

earned one Ford GT based upon your store's Share of the Nation
retail car and truck sales for the 2003 calendar year." Do you
know if they allocated any Ford GT model vehicles for any other
calendar year?
A.

No, I don't know.

Q.

And the next sentence: "Your allocation will be

scheduled between May 2004 and July 2005." What does that mean
to you, sir?
A.

That Henry Day will be offered these cars sometime

between May of '04 and July of '05.
MR. HUGHES: That's all I have, your Honor.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. WILSON:
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BY MR. HUGHES:
Q.

Were you offered a Ford GT from Henry S. Day?

A. Yes.
Q.

When was that, sir?

A.

I don't know. Sometime after this.

Q.

Was it in 2005?

A.

It could have been.

I was offered it through my

lawyers. And I don't remember the date.
Q.

Okay. Was it shortly after you went into the

dealership, sir?
A.

I don't think it was shortly after, no.

Q.

Within a month or two months?

A.

I don't know when.

Q.

What was your answer to the offer to sell you a Ford

GT, sir?
A.

I declined it.

Q.

And were they offering to sell it to you for MSRP?

A. Yes.
MR. HUGHES: Thank you. That's all I have.
MR. WILSON: Nothing further, your Honor.
THE COURT: You may step down. Your next witness,
counsel.
MR. WILSON:

It will be Steve Kersey. He's outside

your Honor.
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1

Q.

What other model GTs have there been?

2

A,

They had a GT Heritage addition.

3

Q.

Is it not unusual for Ford — let me back up. Ford

4

has manufactured a vehicle known as the Mustang?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

And it has had different model names for that

7 Mustang, has it not?
8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

Has there been a period where they've had a

10 particular modeling for Mustang, discontinued that model and
11

then brought it out again?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Can you give us an example, please?

14

A.

A good example would be the Shelby GT500 produced in

15

the sixties, and they now produce that car, similar, you know,

16

same name plate.

17

Q.

Use the same name?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

And when did it come out again, sir?

20

A.

I believe it was 2007.

21

Q.

So is it possible that Ford could yet come out with

22

another GT40?

23

A.

Absolutely.

24

Q.

It wouldn't be inconsistent with what their business

25 practices have been in the past, has it, sir?

1 QQ

A.

No.

Q.

Has Henry S. Day ever had a Ford GT40?

A.

No.

Q.

They've never had one available to sell?

A.

No.

Q.

Ifm going to have you look at Exhibits 6 and 7. And

before we get into that, do you — Henry S. Day returned to the
plaintiff his deposit?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And when about was that, sir?

A.

The end of December 2002.

Q.

And why was that, sir?

A.

I had made a call to Larry Gock (phonetic) , our floor

rqpresentative on the sales side, and asked him if we would, we
would receive a Ford GT40. He told me we would not.
Therefore, the next time we met, we talked about, you know,
returning that money. And that's what we did.
Q.

What do you remember — was this telephone call with

Mr. Gock by telephone or in person?
A.

Telephone.

Q.

And when was it, sir?

A.

It was in December. Don't know the exact date.

Q.

Well, what did Mr. Gock tell you specifically about

whether or not you would be allocated any Ford GT40s to sell?
A.

We wouldn't be receiving a GT40.

JEREMY

DAY
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1

Q.

Did he tell you why?

2

A.

He didn't.

3

Q.

After you had that talk with Mr. Gock, did you

4 prepare the letter which is Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 4?
5

A.

Yes. We had it prepared.

Kelly Hardy, our officer

6 manager, did.
7
8

Q.

When you wrote that letter, sir, did you believe that

you would not have a Ford GT40 to sell to the plaintiff?

9

A.

We did.

10

Q.

In fact, enclosed in that letter was a check which is

11

the second sheet of Exhibit 4?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

And was that cashed, a check negotiated by the

14 plaintiff?
15

A.

Yes, it was.

16

Q.

Between the date or at any point after you sent this

17

letter, and it's Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 4, up through 2000 —

18

let me ask it another way.

19
20

After 2000 — December 2002, when was your next
conversation with the plaintiff?

21
22
23
24
25

A.

It would have been when we had talked on the phone in

Q.

Plaintiff never called you to ask you to keep his

'05.

check?
A.

No.

